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TRUTH IN A POST-TRUTH SOCIETY: HOW
STICKY DEFAULTS, STATUS QUO BIAS,
AND THE SOVEREIGN PREROGATIVE
INFLUENCE THE PERCEIVED
LEGITIMACY OF INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION
S.I. Strong*

Events over the last year have generated significantquestions about
how democratic discourse can proceed in a post-truth society where empiricalevidence has littlepersuasivevalue. JusticeBrandeisoncefamously
claimed that the best way to combatpervasivefalsehoods andpoliticalmisperceptions was through "more speech, " but that strategy is built on the
assumption that errors arise out of information deficits. As contemporary
debate shows, the Brandesian response is ill-suited to a world increasingly
built on "alternativefacts. " Fortunately, interdisciplinary research not
only explains why existing methods ofpersuasionfail, it also describeshow
to combat the problems associatedwith the modern legal andpolitical climate.
The current Article addresses the problem ofpervasive political misconceptions through the lens of the ongoing debate about the legitimacy of
internationalarbitration.Numerous empirical studies indicate that international arbitration-meaningboth internationalcommercial (businessto-business) arbitrationand investment (investor-state)arbitration-offers
a fair and unbiased means of resolving complex, high-value legal disputes
through sophisticated, highly formal procedures that more closely resemble judicialprocedures in commercial courts than domestic arbitration.
Critics routinely ignore this data, however, and continue to question the
validity of the procedure. Why?
*
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Through empirical and theoreticalstudies conducted by politicalscientists, philosophers, psychologists, and economists, this Article demonstrates how threephenomena-sticky defaults, status quo bias, and the sovereignprerogative-workin parallelto create enduring, but demonstrably
incorrect,perceptions about the legitimacy ofinternationalarbitration.Interdisciplinaryresearchalso provides a potentialsolution in the form of a
heuristicknown as the Reversal Test, which acts as an objective diagnostic
tool to identify the influence of unconscious cognitive distortions such as
the status quo bias. Through this analysis, this Article not only addresses
one of the coreparadoxes in internationaldispute resolution, but also provides intriguing insights into policy debates in other fields.
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INTRODUCTION

Over the last few decades, interest in international arbitration has grown
exponentially. Not only has there been a significant increase in the amount of
scholarship in this field, but usage rates have also risen to unprecedented
heights.' Indeed, reports indicate that up to 90% of all international commercial
2
contracts currently include an arbitration provision, with similar mechanisms in
place in approximately 93% of the 3,000-5,000 international investment treaties
3
now in effect.
Some people interpret the extensive use of arbitration in international com-

mercial and investment disputes as reflecting widespread acceptance of the legitimacy of the procedure, 4 a view that is bolstered by the highly prestigious and
1.

S.I.

See GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 61-63, 68, 78, 99 (2d ed. 2014);

STRONG, RESEARCH AND PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION:

SOURCES AND

STRATEGIES 88-137 (2009) [hereinafter STRONG, RESEARCH] (including a bibliography of works in the field).
2. See Otto Sandrock, The Choice Between Forum Selection, Mediation and ArbitrationClauses: European Perspectives,20 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 8, 37 (2009).
See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. ("OECD"), DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PROVISIONS IN
3.
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS: A LARGE SAMPLE SURVEY 5, 9 (2012), http://www.oecd.org/in-

vestment/intemationalinvestmentagreements/50291678.pdf; S.I. Strong, Mass Proceduresas a Form of "Regulatory Arbitration"- Abaclat v. Argentine Republic and the InternationalInvestment Regime, 38 J. CORP. L.
259, 300 n.271 (2013) [hereinafter Strong, Mass Procedures].

4.

See David F. Levi & Mitu Gulati, Judging Measures, 77 UMKC L. REV. 381, 387 (2008).

No. 2])

TRUTH IN A POST-TRUTH SOCIETY

535

profitable nature of this area of law.5 However, neither the extensive use nor the
well-established reputation of international arbitration among users has been
enough to quell all criticism. A variety of individuals, including those within the
judiciary6 and the popular press7 continue to raise questions about the validity
of the procedure. While much of the skepticism is directed at domestic arbitration rather than international arbitration,8 there are concerns that policy-makers
operating in the contemporary "post-truth society" may confuse the two procedures and adopt laws that inappropriately limit cross-border arbitral proceedings. 9

5. See Christopher J. Borgen, TransnationalTribunals and the Transmission ofNorms: The Hegemony
ofProcess, 39 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REv. 685, 718 (2007) (discussing acculturation and prestige in international
arbitration); Susan D. Franck et al., International Arbitration: Demographics, Precision and Justice, in
LEGITIMACY: MYTHS, REALITIES, CHALLENGES, ICCA CONG. SER. No. 18, 33, 79-83 (Albert Jan van den Berg
ed., 2015) [hereinafter Franck et al., LEGITIMACY] (providing empirical data on the prestige ofboth international
commercial arbitration and international investment arbitration); Elizabeth Olson, Growth in GlobalDisputes
Brings Big Paychecksfor Law Firms, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Aug. 26, 2013, 6:31 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/08/26/growth-in-global-disputes-brings-big-paychecks-for-law-firms/?_r0.
6. For example, the Lord Chief Justice of the United Kingdom has said that he believes the private resolution of international disputes hinders the development of the common law, a view that created a furor in the
international community. See Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, Bailii Lecture, Developing Commercial Law Through
the Courts: Rebalancing the Relationship Between the Courts and Arbitration 2 (Mar. 9, 2016), (transcript available at http://www.bailii.org/bailiillecture/04.pdf); Alison Ross & Lacey Yong, "A JudicialLand Grab?" GAR
Live Reacts to Lord ChiefJustice's Proposal, GLOBAL ARB. REv. (May 26, 2016), http://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/1036346/-a-judicial-land-grab-gar-live-reacts-to-lord-chief-justices-proposal. However, Chief
Justice Roberts of the U.S. Supreme Court appears to take the opposite view, as does Sir Vivian Ramsey, a
former English High Court judge. See Lara Bullock, Arbitration FacingMajor Challenges,LAW. WEEKLY (Australia) (Nov. 8, 2016), http://www.lawyersweekly.com.au/news/19918-arbitration-facing-major-challenges
("Arbitration decisions should now have come of age so that they are at least as important in developing the law
as court decisions, and clearly in the international context an arbitration decision is likely to be of some persuasion for another arbitral tribunal."); Richard Wolf, Chief Justice Roberts Seeks to Limit Role of Courts, USA
TODAY (Feb. 4, 2016, 6:03 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2016/02/04/supreme-court-chief-justice-john-roberts-access/79427212/.
7. The best-known of these is a series of highly controversial articles on arbitration published by the New
York Times in late 2015. See Michael Corkery & Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Beware the Fine Print Part III: In
Religious Arbitration, Scripture is the Rule of Law, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Nov. 2, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/03/business/dealbook/in-religious-arbitration-scripture-is-the-rule-of-law.html; Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Michael Corkery, Beware the Fine Print PartII: In Arbitration, a 'Privatizationofthe Justice
System,'N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Nov. 1, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/02/business/dealbook/inarbitration-a-privatization-of-the-justice-system.html; Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Robert Gebeloff, Beware the
Fine Print Part I: Arbitration Everywhere, Stacking the Deck of Justice, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Oct. 31,
2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/1 1/01/business/dealbook/arbitration-everywhere-stacking-the-deck-ofjustice.html?_r-0; Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Michael Corkery, Efforts to Rein in Arbitration Come Under
Well-Financed Attack, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Nov. 15, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/16/business/dealbook/efforts-to-rein-in-arbitration-come-under-well-fmanced-attack.html; see also Hiro N. Aragaki,
Arbitration'sSuspect Status, 159 U. PA. L. REv. 1233, 1235 (2011).
8. For example, the Lord Chief Justice of the United Kingdom was speaking of international arbitration,
although the series of articles that appeared in the New York Times focused primarily on domestic proceedings.
See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text.
9. See Franck et al., LEGITIMACY, supra note 5, at 34 (noting V.V. Veeder had called on "the international arbitration community 'to act now to regulate itself or risk "reputational disaster'"); S.I. Strong, Alternative Facts and the Post-Truth Society: Meeting the Challenge, 165 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 137, 137-38 (2017)
[hereinafter Strong, Alternative Facts]; see also BORN, supra note 1, at 128 (cautioning against the desire to
equate domestic and international arbitration); William S. Blatt, Teaching Emotional Intelligence to Law Students: Three Keys to Mastery, 15 NEv. L.J. 464, 472 (2015) (labelling overgeneralization as a type of cognitive
distortion); Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47 STAN. L. REv. 211,
218 (1995); Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the JudicialMind, 86 CORNELL L. REv. 777, 787 (2001).
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Most of the current debate focuses on investment arbitration, a treaty-based
mechanism that involves quasi-public law claims by foreign investors against
host states. 10 However, international commercial arbitration, a private, business11
to-business, contract-based procedure, has also occasionally come under fire.
Many of the contemporary criticisms are similar to those enunciated during
the early days of the twentieth century, when:
nations regarded international commercial arbitration with a mixture of
suspicion and hostility... . This hostility arose from a reluctance to compromise perceived principles of national sovereignty, a disdain for principles of party autonomy and doubts concerning the fairness, neutrality and
12
efficacy of contemporary international commercial arbitration.
Although distrust of international arbitration waned significantly by the
end of the twentieth century, "the early years of the 21st century have witnessed
a potential resurgence of historic ideological opposition to some aspects or applications of the international arbitral process, with a few states and some com13
mentators condemning the legitimacy and fairness of the process." Thus, the
contemporary arbitral community must contend with a variety of accusations
14
aimed at the "secret" nature of international proceedings, the alleged "cabal"
15
of "insiders" who control the process, and the purportedly detrimental effect
16
that arbitration has on public policy.
Although many of these attacks have little, if any, foundation in fact, they
have very real ramifications on law and policy. 17 Indeed, the lack of popular
understanding about the nature and scope of international arbitration may very
well have contributed to the negative perception of certain international trade
agreements such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership ("TPP") and the subsequent
8
decision to withdraw from negotiations.1

10. See, e.g., HALEY SWEETLAND EDWARDS, SHADOW COURTS: THE TRIBUNALS THAT RULE GLOBAL
TRADE (2016); THE BACKLASH AGAINST INVESTMENT ARBITRATION (Michael Waibel et al. eds., 2010); Sergio
Puig, RecastingICSID's Legitimacy Debate: Towards a Goal-BasedEmpiricalAgenda, 36 FORDHAM INT'L L.J.

465, 468-69 (2013) (citing authorities).
I1. See BORN, supra note 1, at 250; Petra Butler & Campbell Herbert, Access to Justice vs Access to
Justicefor Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises: The Casefor a BilateralArbitrationTreaty, 26 N.Z.U. L. REV.
186, 189 (2014); Susan D. Franck, The Role of InternationalArbitrators, 12 ILSA J. INT'L & COMp. L. 499,
503-04 (2006); Catherine A. Rogers, Transparency in International Commercial Arbitration, 54 U. KAN. L.
REV. 1301, 1301 (2006) [hereinafter Rogers, Transparency]. See generally CATHERINE A. ROGERS, ETHICS IN
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 57-217 (2014).
12. BORN, supra note 1, at 165 (footnotes omitted).
13. Id. at 168 (footnotes omitted) ("It remains to be seen how substantial and long-lived this trend is.").
14. See Rogers, Transparency,supra note 11.
15. See Susan D. Franck et al., The Diversity Challenge: Exploring the "Invisible College" ofInternationalArbitration, 53 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 429, 467-68 (2015) [hereinafter Franck et al., Diversity]; V.V.
Veeder, The HistoricalKeystone to InternationalArbitration: The Party-AppointedArbitrator-fromMiami to
Geneva, 107 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROc. 387, 387 (2013).
16. See Hans Smit, Comments on PublicPolicy in InternationalArbitration, 13 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 65,
65 (2002) (noting four types of public policy concerns in international arbitration).
17. See infra note 23 and accompanying text (regarding empirical data on international arbitration). While
the misperceptions may not rise to the level of "alternative facts," the difference between perception and reality
is nevertheless alarming. See Franck et al., LEGITIMACY, supra note 5, at 34; Strong, Alternative Facts, supra
note 9, at 138-39.
18. See Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), OFF. U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, https://ustr.gov/tradeagreements/free-trade-agreements/trans-pacific-partnership (last visited Jan. 18, 2018) (noting U.S. withdrawal
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Although critics often characterize international arbitration as a lawless,
unprincipled procedure used by corporations bent on circumventing proper judicial oversight,1 9 those who specialize in the field are well aware of numerous
initiatives to address real and perceived ills, which have resulted in increased
self-regulation20 and transparency. 2 1 These measures prove the arbitration world
to be highly responsive to calls for reform, something that cannot be said of
many national judiciaries.22 Furthermore, numerous empirical studies have
found arbitral outcomes and procedures to be fair and unbiased, thereby proving
many of the challenges to international arbitration to be factually inaccurate.23
Although the objective evidence in favor of the legitimacy of international
arbitration is compelling, that data has had little, if any, effect on popular and
judicial perceptions of the procedure. 24 Not only does this phenomenon raise a
number of practical problems, 25 it also creates an analytical paradox that is
from negotiations pursuant to instructions from the executive); see also infra notes 203-05 and accompanying
text.
19. For example, critics of arbitration often claim that it is "lawless," which may be true of some forms
of domestic arbitration, but which is not true of either international commercial arbitration or investment arbitration. See S.I. STRONG, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: A GUIDE FOR U.S. JUDGES 4-5 (2012)

[hereinafter STRONG, JUDICIAL GUIDE] (noting both processes are extremely legalistic as a matter of both procedure and substance).
20.

See INT'L BAR ASS'N, BRA GUIDELINES ON CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION

(2014), http://www.ibanet.org/Publications/publications _IBA_guides and freematerials.aspx#; Catherine A.
Rogers, Regulating InternationalArbitrators:A FunctionalApproach to Developing Standardsof Conduct, 41
STAN. J. INT'L L. 53, 59-60 (2005). Self-regulation, as opposed to external, state-sponsored regulation (often
referred to as the "common and control" model), is currently popular in a variety of fields under the rubric of
"new governance theory." See IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION:
TRANSCENDING

THE DEREGULATION DEBATE 3-4 (Donald R. Harris et al. eds., 1992) (noting new governance theory does not
advocate complete deregulation); Cristie Ford, New Governance in the Teeth ofHuman Frailty: Lessons From
FinancialRegulation, 2010 Wis. L. REV. 441, 442-43, 465 (discussing self-regulation and the recent financial
crisis); Andrew M. Perlman, Toward a Unified Theory ofProfessionalRegulation, 55 FLA. L. REV. 977, 1016
(2003) (discussing self-regulation of the legal profession).
21. See G.A. Res. 69/116, United Nations Convention on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State
Arbitration (Dec. 18, 2014) [hereinafter Transparency Convention]; Franck et al., Diversity, supra note 15, at
467-68; Rogers, Transparency,supra note 11, at 1322 (noting most initiatives to increase transparency come
from within the arbitral community).
22. See Lara A. Bazelon, Putting the Mice in Chargeofthe Cheese: Why FederalJudges CannotAlways
Be Trusted to Police Themselves and What Congress Can Do About It, 97 Ky. L.J. 439, 441-42 (2008); John A.
Dooley III, JudiciaryReform: DoingNothingIsNot an Option, 35 VT. B.J. 27,27 (2009); Rogers, Transparency,
supra note 11, at 1322.
23.

See ARBITRATION INSTITUTE OF THE STOCKHOLM CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, INVESTOR-STATE

DISPUTES AT THE SCC 7 (2017), http://www.sccinstitute.com/media/178174/investor-state-disputes-at-sec13022017-003.pdf (noting most awards have been rendered in favor of respondent states, with 21% of tribunals
declining jurisdiction, 37% denying all of the investor's claims, and 42% of tribunals upholding the investor's
claims in part or in full, and further noting that costs are allocated in an equitable manner, based on relative
success); Christopher R. Drahozal, EmpiricalFindingson InternationalArbitration:An Overview, in OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION (forthcoming); Susan D. Franck et al., Inside the Arbitrator's
Mind, 66 EMORY L.J. 1115, 1166-67 (2017); S.I. Strong, Realizing Rationality: An EmpiricalAssessment of
InternationalCommercial Mediation, 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1793, 1995-96 n.68 (2016) [hereinafter Strong,
Rationality] (listing empirical studies of international arbitration). See generally Franck et al., LEGITIMACY, Supra note 5, at 34-122.
24. See Diane A. Desierto, Rawlsian Fairness and InternationalArbitration, 36 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 939,
948 (2015) ("[T]he critiques on the seeming 'unfairness' of international arbitration apparently arise from expectations wed to a more judicial or structurally adjudicative paradigm of international dispute resolution.").
25. Persistent and pervasive misperceptions about a particular legal device can have serious ramifications
on both law and practice. See Brendan Nyhan & Jason Reifler, The Roles ofInformation Deficits and Identity
Threat in the PrevalenceofMisperceptions, DARTMOUTH 1-2 (Feb. 24, 2017), http://www.dartmouth.edu/-nyhan/opening-political-mind.pdf [hereinafter Nyhan & Reifler, Roles]. The arbitral community is keenly aware
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symptomatic of today's post-truth society. If empirical research shows international arbitration to meet or exceed standard criteria for legitimacy, why do questions about the procedure's validity continue to exist?
Conventional wisdom suggests that people maintain beliefs that are demonstrably incorrect because of "their lack of interest in or knowledge of [the
matter under debate]. Specifically, people may have failed to encounter accurate
26
information about the issues in question." Under this view, the best means of
correcting falsehoods and misinformation is through "more speech," according
to no less eminent an authority than U.S. Supreme Court Justice Louis
27

Brandeis.
The notion of an "information deficit" certainly can be used to explain the
continuing bias against international arbitration, and the concept is indeed consistent with the highly specialized and often confidential nature of arbitral proceedings 28 and the ongoing propensity for non-users to confuse international arbitration with domestic arbitration, despite significant differences between the
two procedures. 29 However, this concept does not explain the recursive nature
of the challenges to international arbitration from people who have not only been
provided with accurate information, but who have a fundamental interest in com30
ing to a correct conclusion on the facts.
The answer to that conundrum may be found in empirical research conducted by Brendan Nyhan and Jason Reifler proving that people can, and often
do, maintain factually inaccurate beliefs if the information is offered "in formats
31
that easily allow for counter-argument." Indeed, Nyhan and Reifler not only
found that some attempts to correct misinformation can actually strengthen misperceptions among those who are most strongly committed to their initial position, they also discovered that people's inability to abandon their biases is particularly pronounced when they are presented with both sides of an argument, as
32
is often the case in legal and political debate.

their
of the need to maintain the reputation of international arbitration among non-users, lest states withdraw
support for the procedure. See Franck et al., LEGITIMACY, supra note 5, at 34.
26. Nyhan & Reifler, Roles, supra note 25, at 2 (citations omitted).
other
27. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring), overruled in part on
grounds by Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); see also Edward Glaeser& Cass R. Sunstein, Does More
25, at 3.
Speech CorrectFalsehoods?,43 J. LEGAL STuD. 65, 65 (2014); Nyhan & Reifler, Roles, supra note
28. See STRONG, RESEARCH, supra note 1, at 3-5.
29. See William. W. Park, The Specificity of International Arbitration: The Casefor FAA Reform, 36
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1241, 1242-43 (2003) (noting the U.S. Federal Arbitration Act is ill-suited to address
all types of arbitration). In fact, international and domestic arbitration differ radically. See BORN, supra note 1,
at 73-93; STRONG, JUDICIAL GUIDE, supra note 19, at 4.
30. See Strong, Alternative Facts, supra note 9, at 138-42 (discussing problems of pervasive political
misconceptions).
31. Nyhan & Reifler, Roles, supranote 25, at 1 (citation omitted).
32. See Brendan Nyhan & Jason Reifler, When Corrections Fail:The PersistenceofPoliticalMispercepthis
tions, 32 POL. BEHAV. 303, 304 (2010) [hereinafter Nyhan & Reifler, Corrections].Journalists also adopt
approach, which does much to explain the inability of media reports to correct political falsehoods. See Nyhan
to
& Reifler, Roles, supra note 25, at 4; Craig Silverman, The Backfire Effect: More on the Press's Inability
Debunk Bad Information, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. (June 17, 2011), http://www.cjr.org/behind
the news/the backfire effect.php.
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This research is very useful in helping to explain the ongoing debate about
legitimacy in international arbitration. 33 For example, lawyers are trained to believe that the best form of persuasion is through content-based arguments (socalled "hard evidence"), which means that the arbitral community has typically
responded to external criticism by addressing the merits of the dispute. 34 However, this strategy fails to recognize that "misperceptions are not just an information problem." 35 Indeed, "the threatening nature of certain facts appears to
inhibit people [including judges, legislators and others who may have a vested
interest in maintaining litigation as the status quo] from acknowledging the true
state of the evidence on controversial issues."36 As a result, "[e]xposure to accurate information may not be enough" to rebut certain types of misconceptions. 37
Nyhan and Reifler also found that people's preexisting views are "likely to
contribute to misperceptions about controversial issues." 38 In fact, their studies
show that "[d]irectionally motivated reasoning-biases in information processing that occur when one wants to reach a specific conclusion-appears to be
the default way in which people process (political) information." 39
This latter phenomenon suggests that those seeking to overcome ongoing
skepticism about the legitimacy of international arbitration may need to reconsider their strategic responses to misperceptions about the procedure. 40 In so doing, the arbitral community should heed Nyhan and Reifler's conclusion that
pervasive "[m]isperceptions often fit comfortably in people's worldviews in this
sense by seeming to confirm people's prior beliefs."41 This phenomenon has
been described by psychologists as "confirmation bias," which is a type of unconscious cognitive distortion that affects rational decision-making. 42 However,
social scientists have empirically demonstrated the existence of many other
types of unconscious biases, including one known as the status quo bias. 43 As
the name suggests, the status quo bias reflects an emotional preference for the
established legal or social norm, regardless of the rationality of that preference.44
In many ways, that description appears to apply perfectly to the situation involving international arbitration. 45 In fact, as shall be seen, the status quo bias not

&

33. See Nyhan & Reifler, Corrections, supra note 32, at 304.
34. See Katherine R. Kruse, EngagedClient-CenteredRepresentationand the Moral Foundationsof the
Lawyer-Client Relationship, 39 HOFSTRA L. REv. 577, 584 (2011); see also ARBITRATION INSTITUTE OF THE
STOCKHOLM CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, supra note 23 and accompanying text.
35. Nyhan & Reifler, Roles, supra note 25, at 2.
36. Id.; see also infra notes 146-48 and accompanying text (discussing why judges and others have an
interest in preserving the status quo).
37. Nyhan & Reifler, Roles, supra note 25, at 1.
38. Id.
39. Id. (citations omitted).
40. See id. at 2; Silverman, supra note 32; see also supranotes 34-35 and accompanying text (discussing
an alternative approach).
41. Nyhan & Reifler, Roles, supra note 25, at 1 (citations omitted).
42. See Lawrence M. Solan, Four Reasons to Teach Psychology to Legal Writing Students, 22 J.L.
POL'Y 7,19-23 (2013).
43. See Nick Bostrom & Toby Ord, The Reversal Test: Eliminating Status Quo Bias in Applied Ethics,
116 ETHICS 656, 660 (2006); see also infra note 133 and accompanying text.
44. See Bostrom & Ord, supra note 43, at 659; Robert A. Prentice & Jonathan J. Koehler, A Normality
Bias in Decision Making, 88 CORNELL L. REv. 583, 597 (2003).
45. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
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only describes why questions continue to arise about the legitimacy of international arbitration, but it also explains why arbitration is so popular among those
who work frequently in the field.46
Therefore, the purpose of this Article is to analyze whether and to what
extent the status quo bias and related phenomena affect the perceived legitimacy
of international arbitration among nonusers. The discussion adopts an interdisciplinary research methodology that draws on empirical and theoretical studies
conducted by political scientists, philosophers, psychologists, and economists.
The Article also describes how to combat the effect of the status quo bias, individually and institutionally. In so doing, this Article not only helps those aiming
to address the legitimacy crisis in international arbitration, but also those seeking
to overcome the difficulties associated with democratic discourse in a post-truth
society.
The discussion proceeds as follows. First, Part II defines the concept of
legitimacy so as to place the rest of the analysis in context. Legitimacy can be
considered from several different perspectives, and it is possible that the debate
about arbitral legitimacy is the result of a lack of consensus about terms.
Next, Part III considers the origin and nature of the status quo bias, using
data drawn from political science, psychology, and behavioral economics. This
research establishes the empirical basis for the status quo bias and strongly suggests that cognitive distortions are affecting the debate about the legitimacy of
international arbitration, regardless of whether participants in those discussions
47
are aware of those influences.
Adherents of the law and economics movement may consider the status
quo bias to be largely analogous to the concept of legal defaults, which are said
to affect rational decision-making by increasing the attractiveness of the established norm. 48 While the two phenomena are similar in many ways, the status
quo bias is an empirically established (i.e., backward-looking) phenomenon ra-

&

46. See infra notes 228-32 and accompanying text (discussing cognitive shifts associated with departing
from the established status quo).
47. Some commentators consider loss aversion and the endowment effect as some of the factors leading
to the irrational preference for the status quo. See Lauren E. Willis, When Nudges Fail:Slippery Defaults, 80 U.
CHI. L. REv. 1155, 1165-68 (2013) (discussing also the effects of discounting, procrastination, and omission
bias); Adam S. Zimmerman, FundingIrrationality,59 DuKE L.J. 1105, 1134-38 (2010) (discussing omission
bias). The "endowment effect" is used to describe "the fact that people often demand much more to give up an
object than they would be willing to pay to acquire it." Daniel Kahneman et al., The Endowment Effect, Loss
Aversion, and Status Quo Bias, 1 J. EcoN. PERSP. 193, 194 (1991) (noting this phenomenon illustrates status quo
bias and reflects a type of loss aversion). Loss aversion describes the perception that the disadvantages of giving
up a particular position or item are more costly than the gains associated with the proposed alternative. See id.
at 197-98. While the legal literature contains numerous references to the endowment effect, some scholars have
suggested that there is no empirical basis for that phenomenon, although empirical researchers have proven the
existence of the status quo bias even when no explicit gains or losses are involved. See Gregory Klass & Kathryn
Zeiler, Against Endowment Theory: Experimental Economics and Legal Scholarship, 61 UCLA L. REV. 2,4-5
(2013); William Samuelson & Richard Zeckhauser, Status Quo Bias in Decision Making, 1 J. RISK
UNCERTAINTY 7, 36 (1988). As a result, this Article will focus on status quo bias, which appears to have a much
stronger empirical foundation, rather than on the endowment effect. See Klass & Zeiler, supra, at 6 (limiting
criticisms to the endowment effect rather than behavioral economics writ large); Russell Korobkin, The Endowment Effect and Legal Analysis, 97 Nw. U. L. REv. 1227, 1228 (2003) [hereinafter Korobkin, Endowment Effect].
48. See Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and ContractDefault Rules, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 608,
612 (1998) [hereinafter Korobkin, Bias].
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ther than a predictive (i.e., forward-looking) theory of behavior. Since both perspectives are important to the current analysis, Part IV delves into the question
of how various default rules, particularly "sticky defaults," relate to questions
about the legitimacy of international arbitration. 49
Although some countries protect the right to proceed to arbitration as a
constitutional concem,50 most, if not all, jurisdictions consider judicial procedures to be the default means of resolving legal disputes.51 The choice of litigation as a systemic default is intriguing, given that arbitration has existed in parallel with litigation since the beginning of recorded history. 52 While this
phenomenon could be due to a variety of factors, one possibility involves an
unconscious perception that the state has a "sovereign prerogative" to resolve
legal disputes. 53 Part V therefore considers whether, as a matter of political science and constitutional legal theory, a presumption of state superiority in dispute
resolution can, or should, be used to justify continuing skepticism about the legitimacy of international arbitration.
Part VI concludes the Article by pulling together the various strings of argument and analysis. The discussion also includes a heuristic on how to identify
status quo bias in this field54 and offers several normative suggestions on how
the international arbitral community should proceed going forward.
Before beginning, it is important to identify four important provisos about
the current analysis. First, this Article focuses exclusively on international arbitration, meaning international commercial arbitration and investment arbitration
(also known as investor-state arbitration).s Domestic forms of arbitration are
expressly excluded from this discussion, although some of the observations and
hypotheses reflected herein may be equally relevant to certain types of domestic
proceedings.
Second, this Article considers investment arbitration and international
commercial arbitration as a combined unit, even though most commentators
working in legitimacy theory approach those two mechanisms separately. This
methodological choice is based on the likelihood that non-specialists (who are,
for the most part, the ones questioning the legitimacy of international arbitration)

49. This connection was first made in the late 1990s. See id.
50. See, e.g., CONSTITUCIN POLITICA DE COLOMBIA [C.P.] art. 116; see also S.I. Strong, International
Arbitrationand the Republic of Colombia: Commercial, Comparative and ConstitutionalConcernsfrom a U.S.
Perspective, 22 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 47, 86-87, 93, 99-105 (2011) [hereinafter Strong, Constitutional]
(discussing constitutional actions involving arbitration).
51. See U.S. CONST. art. m11, §§ 1-2; id. art. IV, § 1; NANCY H. ROGERS ETAL., DESIGNING SYSTEMS AND
PROCESSES FOR MANAGING DISPUTES 116 (Vicki Been et al. eds., 2013).
52. See infra note 191 and accompanying text (regarding the use of arbitration in ancient Greece and
Rome as well as the U.S. colonies).
53. See Robert L. Scharff& Francesco Parisi, The Role ofStatus Quo Bias and Bayesian Learning in the
Creation ofNew Legal Rights, 3 J.L. ECON. & POL'Y 25, 28-30 (2006).
54. See Bostrom & Ord, supra note 43, at 664; see also id. at 679 ("The power of the heuristic lies in its
ability to diagnose cases where status quo bias must be suspected and to challenge defenders of the status quo
in these cases to provide further justification for their views.").
55. A third form of international arbitration-interstate arbitration (also known as state-to-state arbitration}--exists, but arises relatively infrequently and is therefore excluded as well. See Gary Born, A New Generation ofInternationalAdjudication, 61 DUKE L.J. 775, 798, 830, 832 (2012) [hereinafter Born, Generation].
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consider the two procedures to be functionally identical. 56 However, this Article
will address differences between the two procedures when those distinctions are
relevant to the discussion.
Third, this Article sets aside concerns about the "crisis of legitimacy" that
57
is currently said to exist with respect to national and international courts. Eventually, it will be important from a methodological perspective to compare the
58
general perception of litigation to the general perception of arbitration, detailed
discussion of that issue is beyond the scope of the current Article, and nothing
in the following pages should be taken to question the legitimacy of national or
59
international courts.
Fourth and finally, while this Article refers to various challenges to the
legitimacy of both international commercial and investment arbitration, the discussion will not ultimately seek to prove the legitimacy of either process, since
60
that issue is far too detailed to include in the space provided. Instead, this Article focuses on various phenomena (the status quo bias, sticky defaults, and the
sovereign prerogative) that affect rational decision-making about arbitral legitimacy.
II.

LEGITIMACY IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION

A.

Relevant Standards

Recent years have seen a considerable amount of interest in the concept of
legitimacy, with commentators approaching the issue from a variety of perspectives and for a variety of purposes. 61 Because perceptions of legitimacy "may

56. See Blatt, supra note 9, at 472; Eisenberg, supra note 9, at 218. Those with a high degree of familiarity
with international commercial and investment arbitration (i.e., parties and counsel) exhibit a high degree of
satisfaction with the process. See 2008 InternationalArbitration Study - CorporateAttitudes and Practices:
Recognition and Enforcement of ForeignAwards, QUEEN MARY U. LONDON, SCH. INT'L ARB., http://www.arbitration.qmul.ac.uk/research/index.html (last visited Jan. 18, 2018) (containing details regarding seven different
empirical studies concerning international arbitration).
57. See James L. Gibson & Michael J. Nelson, The Legitimacy of the U.S. Supreme Court: Conventional
Wisdoms and Recent Challenges Thereto, 10 ANN. REV. L. & Soc. Scl. 201, 202 (2014); Marjorie E. Komhauser,
Legitimacy and the Right ofRevolution: The Role of Tax Protests and Anti-Tax Rhetoric in America, 50 BUFF.

L. REv. 819, 827 (2002).
58. Questions arise as to whether the public perception of litigation is as positive as it is generally deemed
to be. See Gibson & Nelson, supra note 57, at 215; S.I. Strong, JudicialEducation and Regulatory Capture:
Does the Current System ofEducatingJudges Promote a Well-FunctioningJudiciaryand Adequately Serve the
Public Interest?, 2015 J. DISP. RESOL. 1, 12-13 [hereinafter Strong, Regulatory Capture] (discussing public
perception of judicial performance); Penny J. White, Using Judicial Performance Evaluations to Supplement
InappropriateVoter Cues and Enhance JudicialLegitimacy, 74 Mo. L. REV. 635, 636, 666 (2009).
59. Further reading on legitimacy and litigation is available. See Gibson & Nelson, supra note 57, at 201;
Laurence R. Helfer & Karen J. Alter, Legitimacy and Lawmaking: A Tale of Three International Courts, 14
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 479, 501-02 (2013); Kornhauser, supra note 57, at 827; Frank I. Michelman, Living
with JudiciarySupremacy, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 579, 582 (2003); Orna Rabinovich-Einy, The Legitimacy
Crisisand the Future of Courts, 17 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 23, 24 (2015).
60. Further reading is available. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
61. See Gibson & Nelson, supra note 57, at 202; Dan Priel, The PlaceofLegitimacy in Legal Theory, 57
MCGILL L.J. 1, 6 (2011).
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vary over time and across different international actors," it is possible for different members of the international community to hold different views about the
propriety of international arbitration. 62 However, in general:
The historic record shows that we have moved from the legitimation of
public authority based on one generally accepted concept-legitimacy by
metaphysical myths or the will of God-to a variety of legitimation concepts and strategies. This diversification of legitimacy concepts clearly reflects the increasing refinement and sophistication of governmental structures as well as the growing social pluralism in the modernizing individual
societies. 63
While the evolution of legal and political theory reflects the reality of contemporary law and scholarship, analytic heterogeneity creates its own set of
problems. For example, Jost Delbriick has recognized that "in modern state theory and practice no catch-all concept of legitimacy is prevalent. Although an
increasing number of states adhere to democracy as the basis of legitimate government, other criteria of legitimacy are also applied, partly concurrently, partly
in competition with one another." 64 As a result, any analysis of the legitimacy of
international arbitration must approach the issue from a variety of perspectives.
One of the most well-known definitions of legitimacy comes from Tom
Tyler, who claimed that "[1]egitimacy is a psychological property of an authority, institution, or social arrangement that leads those connected to it to believe
that it is appropriate, proper, and just."65 This approach is reminiscent of the
analytical jurisprudence of Lon Fuller, H.L.A. Hart, Joseph Raz, and other theorists focusing on the internal nature of law, 66 since it describes how and why
people respect legal decisions and rules, even in cases where forcible coercion
is unlikely or impossible. 67 These theories have been successfully applied to international arbitration. 68
The Tyler definition is particularly helpful in the current context, since critics have often challenged the legitimacy of both domestic and international arbitration based on their inability to compel compliance with arbitral awards and
orders without the assistance of a court. 69 However, international arbitration
62. Nienke Grossman, Legitimacy and InternationalAdjudicative Bodies, 41 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV.
107, 160 (2009) [hereinafter Grossman, Legitimacy].
63. Jost DelbrOck, Exercising PublicAuthority Beyond the State: TransnationalDemocracyand/orAlternative Legitimation Strategies?, 10 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 29, 43 (2003).
64. Id.
65. Tom R. Tyler, PsychologicalPerspectiveson Legitimacy and Legitimation, 57 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL.
375, 375 (2006).
66. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 82 (Peter Cane et al. eds., 2d ed. 1997) ("There is a difference ... between the assertion that someone was obliged to do something and the assertion that he had an obligation to do it."); Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law -A Reply to ProfessorHart, 71 HARV. L. REV.
630, 638-43 (1958) (discussing "fidelity to law"); John Linarelli, Analytical Jurisprudenceand the Concept of
Commercial Law, 114 PENN ST. L. REV. 119, 123 (2009) (noting contributions of Hart and subsequent theorists,
such as Joseph Raz); Thomas Schultz, Secondary Rules ofRecognition and Relative Legality in Transnational
Regimes, 56 AM. J. JURIS. 59, 78-79 (2011) (discussing Lon Fuller and Matthew Kramer).
67. See Tyler, supra note 65, at 375, 379.
68. See Joshua Karton, The Structure of InternationalArbitration Law and the Exercise ofArbitralAuthority, 8 CONTEMP. ASIA ARB. J. 229, 247-48 (2015); Schultz, supra note 66, at 63-70.
69. See Michael Hunter Schwartz, Power Outage: Amplifying the Analysis ofPower in Legal Relations
(with Special Application to Unconscionabilityand Arbitration), 33 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 67, 88, 90 (1997)
(noting the link between legitimacy and power and recognizing that force is the most elemental type of power).

544

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 2018

clearly meets the Tyler test, based on empirical data showing that parties volun70
tarily comply with arbitral awards and orders well over 90% of the time. The
fact that a very small number of parties (less than 3%, according to some commentators) seek the assistance of the courts to enforce arbitral awards does not
change this conclusion, since parties also occasionally need judicial assistance
in enforcing litigated outcomes. 71 Furthermore, a number of legal philosophers,
most notably Joseph Raz, have explicitly discussed the legitimacy of arbitration. 72
As useful as the Tyler approach is, it is not perfect. Indeed, theorists discussing psychological legitimacy and the internal motivation of the law often
seem to presume the need for a state actor, 73 since "traditional concepts of legitimacy, particularly those developed since the establishment of the Westphalian
state system, are almost inherently state-centered." 74 The emphasis on the role
of the state is equally evident in the international realm, since legitimacy theorists often focus on how "norms are transferred across the international system
and internalized by states and other actors." 75
Much of the debate about international legitimacy focuses on the nature of
international law and the extent to which an international actor can legislate in
the absence of territorial sovereignty. 76 Some theorists focus on the nature of the

&

Legitimacy theorists operating at the domestic level often focus on the question of why people comply with the
law, including adjudicated decisions. See Richard H. McAdams, The Expressive Power ofAdjudication, 2005
U. ILL. L. REv. 1043, 1045-47. Some commentators have extended their analysis of compliance to arbitration.
See id. at 1048.
70. See BORN, supra note 1, at 3410 ("[Iln practice, the overwhelming majority of international awards
are complied with voluntarily."); Michael Kerr, Concord and Conflict in InternationalArbitration, 13 ARB.
INT'L 121, 129 n.24 (1997) (citing data suggesting that "about 98 per cent of awards in international arbitrations
are honoured or successfully enforced and that enforcement by national courts has only been refused in less than
5 per cent of cases").
71. See FED. R. Ctv. P. 70 (providing five means by which a court can enforce a judgment for a specific
act); 12 FED. PRAC. & PROC. ClV. § 3022 (2014) ("[The power to punish for contempt] has been used with some
frequency in enforcement proceedings."); Kerr, supra note 70, at 129 n.24. No statistics are apparently kept on
the frequency ofjudicial enforcement measures, which include freezing orders, garnishment procedures and the
like, but scholars believe that judicial enforcement is sought much more often than people realize. See Electronic
Letter from Prof. Emeritus Allen Kamp to Prof. S.I. Strong (Dec. 2, 2016) (on file with author); Electronic Letter
from Prof. Jason Kilborn to Prof. S.I. Strong (Nov. 18, 2016) (on file with author).
72. See JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 41-42 (1986) (using binding arbitration as an example
of an authoritative decision that is dependent on the underlying reasons offered by each party in support of their
proposed resolution); Mark Capustin, The Authority of Law in the Circumstances of Politics, 20 CAN. J.L.
JuRIS. 297, 300-01 (2007); JOSEPH RAz, Authority, Law, and Morality, in JOSEPH RAZ, ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC
DOMAIN: ESSAYS IN THE MORALITY OF LAW AND POLITICS 194, 196 (1994).
73. See Linarelli, supra note 66, at 124 (discussing Hart and Raz).
74. Delbrtick, supra note 63, at 30.
75. See Harlan Grant Cohen, FindingInternationalLaw, PartII: OurFragmentingLegal Community, 44
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1049, 1060 (2012); Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey InternationalLaw?,
106 YALE L.J. 2599, 2600 (1999) (framing the question as one of international relations).
76. These debates often follow on in the tradition of nineteenth and twentieth century legal philosophers
such as John Austin and H.L.A. Hart. See THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
INSTITUTIONS 43, 86 (1995); THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS 21 (1990);

Cohen, supra note 75, at 1060-61; Thomas M. Franck, Legitimacy in the InternationalSystem, 82 AM. J. INT'L
L. 705, 706 (1988); Andrew T. Guzman, A Compliance-BasedTheory ofInternationalLaw, 90 CALIF. L. REV.
1823, 1834-35 (2002); Kal Raustiala, The ArchitectureofInternationalCooperation: TransgovernmentalNetworks and the Future ofInternationalLaw, 43 VA. J. INT'L L. 1, 82-83 (2002).
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internationalist endeavor, 77 while others consider the legitimacy of certain substantive norms. 78 Although these analyses have their place, discussions about the
legitimacy of international arbitration are better served by considering legitimacy from a procedural perspective. Methodologically, the best approach involves applying arguments regarding the legitimacy of judicial decisions to arbitration.7 9

A significant number of contemporary commentators have considered the
role of the judiciary in contemporary society, following the lead of legal philosopher Ronald Dworkin, who framed the courts as "the capitals of law's empire."80 Unfortunately, most of the scholars working in this field "define their

legal theories either as a form of defense or challenge to the specific activities
of courts," usually with the goal of "developing institutional principles which
simultaneously define and constrain the activities of courts" so as to demonstrate
the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the activity in question. 81 As a result, most of

these analyses focus on the legitimacy of particular decisions, procedures, or
interpretive theories rather than on the legitimacy of state-sanctioned adjudication. 82

Some assistance may be obtained from commentary considering the legitimacy of international courts, traditionally interpreted as permanent adjudicatory
bodies such as the International Court of Justice ("ICJ"), the International Criminal Court ("ICC"), or the Permanent Court of Arbitration ("PCA").83 Nienke
77. See Nathan Berman, Intervention in a "Divided World": Axes of Legitimacy, in FAULT LINES OF
INTERNATIONAL LEGITIMACY 115, 118-19 (Hilary Charlesworth & Jean-Marc Coicaud eds., 2010).
78. See Jean-Marc Coicaud, Deconstructing International Legitimacy, in FAULT LINES OF
INTERNATIONAL LEGITIMACY, supra note 77, at 29, 30-31 (noting key questions of international legitimacy);
Jean-Marc Coicaud, The Evolution ofInternationalOrderand FaultLines ofInternationalLegitimacy, in FAULT
LINES OF INTERNATIONAL LEGITIMACY, supra note 77, at 87, 100-01.
79. See Yves Dezalay & Bryant Garth, FussingAbout the Forum: Categories and Definitions as Stakes
in a ProfessionalCompetition, 21 LAW& Soc. INQUIRY 285, 299 (1996) ("The legitimacy of international commercial arbitration is no longer built on the fact that arbitration is informal and close to the needs of business;
rather legitimacy now comes more from a recognition that arbitration is formal and close to the kind of resolution
that would be produced through litigation-more precisely, through the negotiation that takes place in the context of U.S.-style litigation."); Rabinovich-Einy, supra note 59, at 26-27 ("As courts become more flexible and
ADR procedures more formalized, new sources of legitimacy need to be developed and conceptualized....
[P]rinciples developed in the field of dispute systems design DSD as a framework for generating legitimacy in
courts as well as ADR, based on the recognition that the formal-informal divide has lost much of its strength.").
80. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 407 (1986); see also Priel, supra note 61, at 1-5 (discussing legitimacy in the context of the work of Ronald Dworkin and other positivists). Some classical theorists, most notably
Thomas Hobbes, did not distinguish between the role of arbitrators and judges. David Dyzenhaus, The Very Idea
of a Judge, 60 U. TORONTO L.J. 61, 68-69 (2010). Some commentators have gone so far as to suggest that
positivists' real aim is to have law without judges, since the act of judging results in indeterminacy. See id. at
62.
81. Adeno Addis, Adjudication andInstitutionalLegitimacy, 71 B.U. L. REv. 161, 161-62 (1991).
82. See RICHARD A. POSNER, DIVERGENT PATHS: THE ACADEMY AND THE JUDICIARY 269 (2016) (calling
for a more robust analysis of the structure of judicial decisions rather than their content). The one exception
involves the legitimacy of judicial decisions imposed by illegitimate states (such as those with questionable
international status) or by judges enforcing immoral laws (as was the case in Nazi Germany and Vichy France).
See Norman L. Greene et al., Nazis in the Courtroom:Lessons from the Conduct ofLawyers and Judges Under
the Laws ofthe Third Reich and Vichy France, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 1121, 1126-27 (1995) (discussing, among
other things, whether Germanjudges' error was too adamant an adherence to positivism); H. Lauterpacht, Recognition of States in InternationalLaw, 53 YALE L.J. 385, 426-27 (1944) (discussing effect of nonrecognition of
states).
83. See Born, Generation,supra note 55, at 794; Nienke Grossman, The Normative Legitimacy ofInternational Courts, 86 TEMP. L. REV. 61, 80 (2013) [hereinafter Grossman, Normative].
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Grossman has suggested that these institutions can be considered legitimate if
four criteria are met, stating:
First, legal persons whose international legal rights and duties are at issue
in international court proceedings must have the right to present their
views. Second, to the extent international courts are making law or policy,
those potentially affected should have the ability to participate. Third, international courts are legitimate when they help states to better comply
with a core set of human rights obligations than states would without international courts. Fourth, international courts cannot facilitate the violation of core norms by states and still retain their legitimacy. Finally, legitimacy requires that courts act in a manner generally consistent with the
object and purpose of the normative regimes they interpret and apply.84
These criteria appear largely applicable to international arbitration. For example, international arbitration requires procedures that allow both parties to
present their positions to the tribunal,8 5 provides for third-party participation
(amicus briefs) in cases where the outcome affects persons other than the liti87
gants, 86 and reflects the normative values contained in the governing law. Certain other principles (such as those relating to the incorporation of human rights
89
considerations 88 and respect for core principles of international public policy

84. Grossman, Normative, supra note 83, at 104.
85. See BORN, supra note 1, at 2140-41.
86. This issue arises primarily in investment arbitration, which affects public interests in a way that international commercial arbitration typically does not. See Katia Fach G6mez, Rethinking the Role ofAmicus Curiae
in InternationalInvestment Arbitration:How to Draw the Line Favorablyfor the PublicInterest, 35 FORDHAM
INT'L L.J. 510, 523 (2012). Indeed, the quasi-public nature of investment arbitration has resulted in
a hegemonic critique of international investment law that originates from a Marxist analysis of international
law and views intemational investment law as an attempt by developed countries to impose their power on
weaker, developing countries; and . . . a more nuanced critique of the perceived unevenness created by a
regime that protects property, investment, and foreign investors without sufficient regard to other noninvestment-related interests of host states. Both strands consistently turn, however, around a common core:
the criticism that investment treaties unilaterally favor the interests of investors over the host state's competing interests, thus establishing an asymmetric legal regime that is detrimental to state sovereignty.
Charles N. Brower & Stephan W. Schill, Is Arbitration a Threat or a Boon to the Legitimacy of International
Investment Law?, 9 CHI. J. INT'L L. 471, 474-75 (2009) (citations omitted). Space restrictions preclude a detailed
analysis of these issues here, but they do bear mention.
87. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 637 n.19 (1985) (discussing the second-look doctrine in intemational commercial arbitration); Case C-126/97, Eco Swiss China Time
Ltd. v. Benetton Int'l NV, 1999 E.C.R. 1-3055 (requiring competition law to be taken into account in arbitration);
BORN, supra note 1, at 2129-30. While investment arbitration is currently struggling with the question of
whether normative law is properly taken into account given the absence of hard precedent, no one seriously
doubts that arbitral tribunals seek to apply treaty law in investment proceedings.
88. Commentators have considered the role of human rights in international commercial arbitration and
found the current approach appropriate. See Neil McDonald, More Harm Than Good? Human Rights Considerations in InternationalCommercialArbitration,20 J. INT'L ARB. 523, 537 (2003). The issue is slightly different
in the investment realm. See Susan Karamanian, The Place of Human Rights in Investor-State Arbitration, 17
LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 423, 423-24 (2013).
89. Authorities agree that international commercial arbitration clearly protects substantive and procedural
public policy. See BORN, supra note 1, at 2649-50; INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, PUBLIC POLICY AS A
BAR TO ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL AWARDS (2000), http://www.academia.edu/18312524/ILA_
FINALREPORT ONPUBLICPOLICYAS_A_BARTOENFORCEMENT_OF_INTERNATIONAL_A
RBITRALAWARDSNEWDELHI 2002; INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, FINAL REPORT ON PUBLIC
POLICY AS A BAR TO ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRAL AWARDS (2002), http://www.ila-hq.org/

en/committees/index.cfm/cid/1 9.
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are clearly met in international commercial arbitration and arguably met in investment arbitration. 90 However, steps have been taken by the international investment community to address both of these concerns. 91
Some commentators have suggested that international bodies such as the
ICJ, the ICC, and the PCA have benefitted greatly from the explicit grant of
sovereignty reflected in the international treaties creating those mechanisms,
leading to what has been called the "state consent" model of international adjudication. 92 It is possible to bring international arbitration within this paradigm
by focusing on the jurisdictional nature of international commercial and investment arbitration, since both mechanisms require some type of state consent. 93
Indeed, some commentators, most notably Gary Born, have explicitly argued
that international arbitration reflects the "second generation" of international adjudication. 94 However, a state-centric model may not be the best way of considering the legitimacy of the international arbitral regime, given the concurrent
need for party consent in both investment and commercial proceedings. 95
As useful as consent-based theories of legitimacy may be, such approaches
fail to take into account other perspectives on legitimacy, including the concept
of legal legitimacy, which focuses on the correctness of particular determinations as a matter of law; moral legitimacy, which considers certain extra-legal
concepts of fairness and respect; and sociological legitimacy, which describes
why people should, or in fact do, respect certain institutions for reasons other
than self-interest. 96 However, Grossman has suggested that these principles,
taken together, indicate that an adjudicative mechanism like international arbi-

90. Overall, investment arbitration has met with more criticism than intemational commercial arbitration.
See Born, Generation,supra note 55, at 842-43. However, many of the concerns are similar to those that were
overcome in the world of international commercial arbitration in the late twentieth century. See BORN, supra
note 1, at 165.
91. See Karamanian, supra note 88, at 426-32 (discussing human rights and investment arbitration); J.
Anthony VanDuzer, Enhancingthe ProceduralLegitimacy ofInvestor-State Arbitration Through Transparency
and Amicus Curiae Participation,52 McGLL L.J. 681, 684-85 (2007) (discussing international public policy
and investment arbitration).
92. Grossman, Normative, supra note 83, at 65-66; see also S.I. Strong, Discovery Under 28 US.C.
§ 1782: DistinguishingInternationalCommercialArbitrationand InternationalInvestment Arbitration, I STAN.
J. COMPLEX LITIG. 295, 327 (2013) [hereinafter Strong, Section 1782].
93. See Strong, Section 1782, supra note 92, at 323-50 (discussing grants ofjurisdiction); see also JULIAN
D.M. LEW ET AL., COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION ¶¶ 5-9 to 5-15 (2003).
94. See Born, Generation,supra note 55, at 860; Delbriick, supra note 63, at 33-34 (discussing the need
to consider legitimacy beyond the state model); Laura A. Dickinson, The Promise ofHybrid Courts, 97 AM. J.
INT'L L. 295, 301 (2003) (discussing the need to establish "perceived" legitimacy (as opposed to political legitimacy or democratic legitimacy) in the context of special international tribunals). International law has also
placed an increasing emphasis on the obligations of private persons, as opposed to state entities. See Paul B.
Stephan, The New InternationalLaw-Legitimacy, Accountability, Authority, and Freedom in the New Global

Order, 70 U. COLO. L. REv. 1555, 1563 (1999).
95. See Strong, Section 1782, supra note 92, at 334, 339-46. Indeed, some commentators claim that arbitral legitimacy can and should be based solely on the consent of the parties. See George A. Bermann, The "Gateway" Problem in InternationalCommercial Arbitration, 37 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 2-3 (2012); see also LEW ET
AL., supra note 93, ¶¶ 5-16 to -21 (discussing the jurisdictional and contractarian theories of international arbitration).
96. See Grossman, Legitimacy, supra note 62, at 115-16; see also Delbrtlck, supra note 63, at 33-34.
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tration "is legitimate when it is (1) fair and unbiased, (2) interpreting and applying norms consistent with what states believe the law is or should be, and
97
(3) transparent and infused with democratic norms."
B.

Putting Theory into Practice

Although this Article does not seek to prove the legitimacy of international
arbitration per se, it is nevertheless helpful for present purposes to describe
briefly how international arbitration meets the test for legitimacy identified at
the end of the preceding section so as to provide a basis for subsequent discussions. 98 First, numerous empirical studies have concluded that arbitration provides a fair and unbiased means of resolving international commercial and investment disputes. 99 Although it can be difficult to measure judicial performance
at either the national or international level,100 some research suggests that international arbitration is superior to many national courts, particularly in cases involving international commercial and investment law.101
Second, research strongly suggests that international arbitration complies
03
02
with state-supported norms, both as a procedurall and substantive matter.1
97. Grossman, Legitimacy, supra note 62, at 115; see also Delbrack, supra note 63, at 33-34. Initially,
this test was said not to apply to intemational commercial arbitration (as opposed to investment arbitration)
"because different legitimacy-influencing factors come into play when only private parties are involved." Grossman, Legitimacy, supra note 62, at 111. However, upon closer examination these criteria can be met by both
international commercial arbitration and investment arbitration. See infra notes 98-127 and accompanying text.
98. See Grossman, Legitimacy, supranote 62, at 115 (stating that, to be legitimate, a procedure needs to
be "(1) fair and unbiased, (2) interpreting and applying norms consistent with what states believe the law is or
should be, and (3) transparent and infused with democratic norms").
99. See, e.g., Franck et al., LEGITIMACY, supra note 5, at 61; Susan D. Franck,Development and Outcomes
ofinvestment Treaty Arbitration, 50 HARV. INT'L L.J. 435, 486-87 (2009); see also supra note 23 and accompanying text.
100. See Performance Measures Topic Brief WORLD BANK, http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/

EXTERNAL/OPICS/EXTLAWJUSTINST/0,,contentMDK:20756997~menuPK:2025688~pagePK:210058~
piPK:210062-theSitePK: 1974062,00.html (last visited Jan. 18,2018) [hereinafter WORLD BANK, Performance];
Stephen Choi & Mitu Gulati, A Tournament ofJudges?, 92 CALIF. L. REv. 299, 305-15 (2004). Nevertheless,
some comparative studies exist. See Benchmarks and Comparative Data, WORLD BANK, http://web.world
36 92

1
bank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTLAWJUSTINST/,,contentMDK:20746049~menuPK:20
-pagePK:210058-piPK:210062-theSitePK:1974062,00.html (last visited Jan. 18, 2018) [hereinafter WORLD
EffiBANK, Benchmarks]; EUROPEAN COMM'N FOR THE EFFICIENCY OF JUSTICE, European JudicialSystems:
6
ciency and Quality of Justice (2016), http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/cepej/evaluation/201 /publica-

tion/CEPEJ%20Study%2023%20report%2OEN%20web.pdf (discussing data collected in 2014) [hereinafter
EuR. JUD. SYSTEMS]; Judicial Performance and Its Determinants:A Cross-CountryPerspective, ORG. FOR
EcON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., http://www.oecd.org/eco/growth/judicial-performance.htm (last visited Jan.

18, 2018).
101. See, e.g., Joseph R. Brubaker, The Judge Who Knew Too Much: Issue Conflicts in InternationalAdjudication, 26 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 111, 116-34 (2008) (considering bias issues concerning the International
Court of Justice, various international criminal courts, the World Trade Organization, and investment arbitration); Jacob Katz Cogan, InternationalCriminalCourts and FairTrials: Difficulties and Prospects, 27 YALE J.
INT'LL. 111, 116 (2002) (noting difficulty of identifying fairness of international courts); see also OECD, supra
note 3.
102. See S.I. Strong, Limits of ProceduralChoice of Law, 39 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 1027, 1100-01 (2014)
[hereinafter Strong, ProceduralChoice]; see also S.I. Strong, Reasoned Awards in InternationalCommercial
Arbitration:Embracing and Exceeding the Common Law-Civil Law Dichotomy, 37 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1, 19
(2015) [hereinafter Strong, Reasoned Awards].
103. See BORN, supra note 1, at 2130; Susan D. Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration:PrivatizingPublicInternationalLaw Through InconsistentDecisions, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1521, 1557
(2005) [hereinafter Franck, Inconsistent];Franck et al., LEGITIMACY, supra note 5, at 78 (considering legitimacy
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For example, international arbitration is as procedurally sophisticated as national
court proceedings concerning similar types of disputes.10 4 Indeed, the most common criticism of international arbitration is not that it is too informal, but that it
is too legalistic. 105
International arbitration is equally competent in matters of substance. 106
Indeed, some commentators believe that arbitrators may be better than national
judges in some types of substantive decision-making, most notably in cases involving the application of a foreign country's mandatory rules of law, due to the
heightened neutrality associated with arbitration. 107 International arbitration is
also more flexible than litigation with respect to the choice of applicable law,
although states are seeking to expand party autonomy in judicial procedures to
the same level seen in international arbitration through promulgation of the
Hague Principles on Choice of Law in International Commercial Contracts.108
Finally, international arbitration appears to comply with standards regarding transparency and democratic ideals, although this is admittedly the most contentious of the three elements. 109 These matters have been considered most comprehensively in investment proceedings, since those disputes are considered
quasi-public in nature, and recent years have seen a series of reforms meant to
respond to concerns regarding transparency and the so-called "democratic deficit."110 For example, the United Nations Commission on International Trade
Law ("UNCITRAL") adopted the UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in
Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration in 2013,111 followed by the United Nations Convention on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration in
2014.112 As a result of these and other initiatives, outside scrutiny can now be
brought to bear on arbitral hearings, which are increasingly made open to the

as substantive justice, particularly with respect to "prestige of arbitration, the reappointment of arbitrators and
interaction with co-arbitrators, fraud, and diversity").
104. See BORN, supra note 1, at 2129-30.
105. See id. at 2127.
106. See id. at 2130.
107. See id.; Catherine A. Rogers, The Vocation of the InternationalArbitrator, 20 AM. U. INT'L L. REV.
957, 995-96 (2005) [hereinafter Rogers, Vocation].
108. See Hague Conference on Private International Law, Principles on Choice of Law in International
Commercial Contracts, art. 3 (2015), https://assets.hcch.net/docs/5da3ed47-f54d-4c43-aaef-5eafc7clf2al.pdf;
Genevieve Saumier, The Hague Principles and the Choice ofNon-State "Rules ofLaw" to Govern an International Commercial Contract,40 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 1, 4-5 (2014) (noting that states have traditionally resisted
this degree of party autonomy in litigation).
109. See Franck, Inconsistent, supra note 103, at 1557; Grossman, Legitimacy, supra note 62, at 115.
110. See Andrea K. Bjorklund, The Emerging Civilizationofinvestment Arbitration, 113 PENN ST. L. REV.
1269, 1270-71, 1273 (2009) (describing the mixed public-private features of investment arbitration); Born, Generation, supra note 55, at 842-43 ("Investment arbitration has faced substantial criticism since the turn of the
twenty-first century. Some of these complaints have been directed broadly at foreign investment and the basic
premise of international investment protection, typically claiming that investment arbitration is skewed in favor
of foreign investors. Other criticisms have focused on specific features of investment arbitration, including its
lack of transparency, its insufficiently determinate legal standards, its lack of opportunities for amicus curiae
participation, and its lack of appellate review.") (footnotes omitted).
111. See United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Rules on Transparency in
Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration, as adopted by G.A. Res. 68/109, U.N. Doc. A/68/462, at 1-3
(Dec. 16, 2013), http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/rules-on-transparency/Rules-on-Transparency-E.pdf.
112. See Transparency Convention, supra note 21.
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3
public through live-stream technology,1 and on arbitral awards, which are now
routinely published in full.114
International commercial arbitration has adopted a number of similar
measures.1 5 Some of these initiatives, such as those involving increased trans6
parency in arbitral selection, are of relatively recent origin."l Others, such as
those involving the publication of selected arbitral awards, are of much longer
duration.1 7 Social interests in transparency of private commercial disputes may
also be met through the public policy exception to enforcement of arbitral
awards, which allows states to raise concerns about the procedural or substantive
8
legitimacy of certain awards sua sponte.11
International arbitration is also capable of addressing other transparencyrelated concerns. For example, the long-standing tradition of requiring fully reasoned awards in both international commercial and investment arbitration provides the parties themselves with an excellent understanding of the reasoning
underlying individual decisions."l 9 International commercial and investment arbitration are also both capable of resolving various types of large-scale injuries
at a single time, in a single venue, which would overcome certain transparency-

113. For example, three ICSID proceedings have been opened to the public since the beginning of 2016.
See Bear Creek Mining Corp. v. Republic of Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/21 (public hearing broadcast online
from Sept. 7, 2016 to Sept. 14, 2016); Gabriel Res. Ltd. & Gabriel Res. (Jersey) v. Rom., ICSID Case No.
ARB/15/31 (public hearing broadcast via close circuit television at the ICSID headquarters on Sept. 23, 2016);
Vattenfall AB v. Fed. Republic of Ger., ICSID Case No. ARB/12/12 (public hearing broadcast online from Oct.
10, 2016 to Oct. 21, 2016, with a four-hour delay as agreed by the parties); Press Release, Vattenfall AB, International Arbitration Proceedings by Vattenfall Against the Federal Republic of Germany: Hearing Starts on
Monday as a Video Stream (Oct. 6, 2016), https://corporate.vattenfall.com/press-and-media/press-releases/
2016/interational-arbitration-proceedings-by-vattenfall-against-the-federal-republic-of-germany-hearingstarts-on-monday-as-a-video-stream/; ICSID Holds Hearing in Mining-RelatedDispute FiledAgainst Romania,
LEXis LEGAL NEWS (Sept. 21, 2016), http://www.lexislegalnews.com/articles/11329; Bear Creek Mining Corporationv. Republic ofPeru (ICSID Case No. ARB/1 4/21)-PublicHearing, ISDS (Aug. 15, 2016), http://isds.bilaterals.org/?bear-creek-mining-corporation-v; see also ICSID, LIVESTREAM, https://livestream.com/ICSID (including other hearings). Since 2002, all U.S. international agreements involving investor-state dispute
settlement, including those arising under the North American Fair Trade Agreement ("NAFTA"), must be open
to the public via close-circuit television or live video. See, e.g., Hearing: Spence InternationalInvestments et al.
v. Republic of Costa Rica (ICSID Case No. UNCT/13/2)-Public Hearing, LIVESTREAM (Apr. 24, 2015),
http://livestream.com/ICSID/events/3954046 (involving a case heard publicly in 2015 pursuant to the Central
American Fair Trade Act ("CAFTA")).
114. Many treaty-based awards are now published in their entirety. See Award - ICSID Convention Arbitration, INT'L CENTRE FOR SETTLEMENT INV. DISPuTES (2017), https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/process/Award-Convention-Arbitration.aspx.
115. See Alexandra D. Lahav, The Roles ofLitigation in American Democracy, 65 EMORY L.J. 1657,168384 (2016); Rogers, Transparency, supra note 11, at 1322-37.
116. See Catherine Rogers, A Window into the Soul of InternationalArbitration:Arbitrator Selection,
Transparency and Stakeholder Interests, 46 VICT. U. WELLINGTON L. REv. 1179, 1187 (2015) (discussing the
Arbitrator Intelligence project).
117. See STRONG, RESEARCH, supra note 1, at 44-45, 83-85.
118. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-307 (2012); G.A. Res 40/72, U.N. Doc. A/40/17 (Dec. 11, 1985), revised by G.A.
Res 61/33, U.N. Doc. A/61/17 (Dec. 4, 2006), http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral-texts/arbitration/1985Modelarbitration.htmi [hereinafter UNCITRAL Model Arbitration Law]; United Nations Convention
on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards art. V(2)(b), June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2518,
330 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter New York Convention]; Lahav, supra note 115, at 1683-84.
119. See Strong, Reasoned Awards, supra note 102, at 2.
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related problems generated by bilateral procedures.1 20 Interestingly, the U.S. Supreme Court has not identified any concerns about transparency in this context
and has instead explicitly adopted a rule that reduces transparency in matters
involving class or collective claims.1 21
While the emphasis on transparency as a proxy for legitimacy makes some
sense, the claim that a dispute resolution process must be "infused with democratic norms" is somewhat more difficult to analyzel 22 because most countries
do not elect their judges and actually intend the judiciary to operate in a countermajoritarian manner. 123 Furthermore, the claim that litigation reflects the values
of deliberative democracy through election or appointment of judges by democratically elected representatives1 24 fails to recognize that arbitration fulfills similar goals in perhaps an even more direct manner through its "commitment to the
Habermassian [sic] foundations ... that 'the acted upon [i.e., the parties] should
assent to the rules or decisions that are made about them,' preferably after full
120.

See S.I. STRONG, CLASS, MASS, AND COLLECTIVE ARBITRATION IN NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL

LAW 235 (2013) [hereinafter STRONG, CLASS ARBITRATION] (discussing class, mass, and collective arbitration
and the need for arbitrators to appreciate the existence and scope of other, similar damages to provide proper
redress). Class arbitrations can arise in the international setting. See Stolt-Neilsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l

Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 666 (2010).
121. Restrictions on large-scale arbitration (such as through the use of private waivers) have received judicial approbation in the United States, despite the opposition of the arbitral community, thereby resulting in decreased transparency in class actions and other collective disputes. See STRONG, CLASS ARBITRATION, supra
note 120, at 249-53 (discussing Am. Exp. Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2312 (2013) and AT&T
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 352 (2011)). This issue is again coming before the Supreme Court
in the context of labor arbitration. See Morris v. Ernst & Young LLP, 834 F.3d 975, 991 (9th Cir. 2016), cert.
granted, 137 S. Ct. 809 (2017); Lewis v. Epic Sys. Corp., 823 F.3d 1147, 1161 (7th Cir. 2016), cert. granted,
137 S. Ct. 809 (2017); Murphy Oil USA, Inc. v. NLRB, 808 F.3d 1013, 1021 (5th Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 137
S. Ct. 809 (2017).
122. Grossman, Legitimacy, supra note 62, at 115; see also Born, Generation, supra note 55, at 779;
Delbrtilck, supra note 63, at 33-34; Grossman, Legitimacy, supra note 62, at 160.
123. See Strong, Regulatory Capture, supra note 58, at 3. The United States appears to be the only jurisdiction in the world to select its judges through popular election. At this point,
twenty-two states use contested judicial elections to select their judges, with seven states holding partisan
elections and fifteen using non-partisan elections, i.e., elections in which the party affiliation of the candidates is not shown on the ballot. Thirteen states use some form of the Missouri Plan, named for the state
that first adopted this form of "merit" selection. The remaining fifteen states employ some variation of the
federal model, mixing executive appointment with some form of legislative confirmation. And the experiment continues "in 2011, [with] 26 states . . . consider[ing] legislation to change or replace their judicial
merit selection systems."
Scott W. Gaylord, Unconventional Wisdom: The Roberts Court's ProperSupport ofJudicialElections, 2011
MICH. ST. L. REv. 1521, 1522 (2011) (citation omitted) ("Conventional wisdom, however, holds that the experiment with judicial elections has failed . . ."). The only other countries to include an electoral element to judicial
selection are Switzerland, which appoints judges through election by the Federal Assembly, and Japan, which
allows judges to be removed from the bench through a referendum. See NIHONKOKU KENPO [KENPO]
[CONSTITUTION], art. 78-79 (Japan), http://www.shugiin.go.jp/intemet/itdb english.nsf/html/statics/english/
constitution e.htm; Benjamin Suter, Appointment, Discipline and Removal of Judges: A Comparison of the
Swiss and New Zealand Judiciaries,46 VICT. U. WELLINGTON L. REv. 267, 280 (2015); Sher Watts Spooner,
Why Does America Elect Judges, Anyway?, DAILY Kos (Mar. 6, 2016, 10:00 AM), http://www.dailykos.com/story/2016/3/6/1489191/-Why-does-America-elect-judges-anyway.
124. See Corinna Barrett Lain, Upside-Down JudicialReview, 101 GEO. L.J. 113, 116 (2012) ("Sometimes
in a representative democracy, the representative branches aren't.") (emphasis in original) (noting that certain
theoretical presumptions about democratic ideals may sometimes be reversed in practice); David E. Pozen, The
Irony ofJudicialElections, 108 COLUM. L. REv. 265, 272 (2008) (discussing various conflicts regarding the role
of the judiciary and of democratic values); Judith Resnik, Judicial Selection and Democratic Theory: Demand,
Supply, and Life Tenure, 26 CARDOzO L. REv. 579, 594-95 (2005) (suggesting judicial election is more democratic than judicial appointment).
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participation in reasoned deliberation, with the hearing of 'others' and fair decision rules."l 25 Indeed, if, as Alexandra Lahav has argued, "democracy is selfgovernment," then arbitration fulfills that goal to the same extent as litigation, if
126
not more.

As this brief discussion shows, international arbitration more than meets
the basic criteria for legitimacy. Why, then, do critics continue to question the
legitimacy of international arbitration? The answer may very well be found in
27
the psychological phenomenon known as the status quo bias.1
III. THE

STATUS

Quo

BIAS

In a rational world, debates about the merits of international arbitration
28
would focus solely on the inherent utility of the procedure.1 Rational choice
theory is popular among both legal scholars (particularly devotees of the law and
economics movement) and political scientists 29 and has been applied in a vari30
ety of settings, including international dispute resolution.1

125. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, DeliberativeDemocracy and Conflict Resolution, 12 DIsP. RESOL. MAG. 18,
19 (2006) [hereinafter Menkel-Meadow, Deliberative Democracy] (discussing JORGEN HABERMAS, THE
THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION (Thomas McCarthy trans., 1984)). Although constitutional theorists are
often "obsessed" with the countermajoritarian features of judicial review, few academics discuss arbitration as
a means of addressing the democratic deficit by allowing parties to choose the mechanism and the individuals
who resolve their legal disputes. See Barry Friedman, The Birth ofan Academic Obsession: The History ofthe
CountermajoritarianDifficulty, PartFive, 112 YALE L.J. 153, 158-59 (2002).
126. Lahav, supra note 115, at 1661. As Lahav notes:
Litigation is usually understood as providing two useful ends. The default, and perhaps most hard-wired,
conception of litigation is as a mechanism for dispute resolution. ... A second, somewhat less dominant
but still prevalent model of litigation is as a system for law declaration.. . . Both of these approaches to
litigation look at the ends of litigation: in the first model, resolution, and in the second model, law production and clarification. Both contribute to the regulatory function of litigation because individuals and organizations anticipate or leam from the results adjudication and adjust their behavior accordingly. This
Article presents a third understanding of litigation as a process in which litigants perform self-government.
Id. at 1658-59; see also Schultz, supra note 66, at 70-71 (noting the role of self-govemance in the work of
Jtirgen Habermas and in international arbitration).
127. See Nyhan & Reifler, Roles, supra note 25, at 2.
128. While there is no single definition of rational choice theory, "most versions ... assume that the intensity of individuals' preferences for an entitlement derive solely from the inherent utility of that entitled to the
individual." Korobkin, Endowment Effect, supra note 47, at 1227; see also Samuelson & Zeckhauser, supra note
47, at 8 ("A fundamental property of the rational choice model, under certainty or uncertainty, is that only preference-relevant features of the alternatives influence the individual's decision. Thus, neither the order in which
the alternatives are presented nor any labels they carry should affect the individual's choice.").
129. See Robert 0. Keohane, Rational Choice Theory and InternationalLaw: Insights and Limitations, 31
J. LEGAL STuD. 307, 307 (2002) (noting political scientists have been using rational choice theory since the early
1980s, although international lawyers did not adopt this framework until later). Rational choice theory has long
been used in international law and international relations. See Kenneth W. Abbott, Modern InternationalRelations Theory: A Prospectusfor InternationalLawyers, 14 YALE J. INT'L L. 335, 337 (1989); Keohane, supra, at
307; Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, InternationalLaw and InternationalRelations Theory: A Dual Agenda, 87
AM. J. INT'LL. 205, 220 (1993); Alexander Thompson, Applying Rational Choice Theory to InternationalLaw:
The Promise and Pitfalls, 31 J. LEGAL STuD. 285, 286 (2002).
130. Rational choice theory has been used to discuss everything from disclosure in international arbitration
to dispute system design. See, e.g., Giacomo Rojas Elgueta, UnderstandingDiscovery in InternationalCommercial Arbitration Through BehavioralLaw and Economics:A Journey Inside the Mind ofPartiesand Arbitrators,
16 HARV. NEGOT. L. REv. 165, 165 (2011); Sandeep Gopalan, A Demandeur-CentricApproach to Regime Design in International Commercial Law, 39 GEO. J. INT'L L. 327, 330 (2008); Peter B. Rutledge, Convergence
and Divergence in InternationalArbitration,2012 J. DisP. RESOL. 49, 50 (2012).
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Although some commentators have called for increased reliance on rational choice theory in analyses of international arbitration,131 there is a significant problem with that approach, namely extensive evidence that people do not
actually adopt optimum rationality.1 32 Instead, numerous empirical studies have
shown that decision-making is affected by a variety of factors that can result in
"[d]irectionally motivated reasoning." 33 Among other things, people often rely
on unconscious "biases in information processing that occur when one wants to
reach a specific conclusion."l 34
One well-documented cognitive distortion is the status quo bias, which
arises when an individual or institution prefers the established course of action
over any available alternatives, even if those alternatives would increase the welfare of the decision-maker.135 While most analyses of the status quo bias focus
on questions of substantive law,1 36 the principles are equally applicable to procedural issues, including those involving arbitration.1 37
According to William Samuelson and Richard Zeckhauser, "[t]he status
quo bias is best viewed as a deeply rooted decision-making practice stemming
partly from a mental illusion and partly from psychological inclination."138 Because the phenomenon operates on an unconscious level, it is extremely difficult
to identify and overcome, 139 particularly given the "bias blind spot, which prevents us from taking our own biases as seriously as we do the biases of others."l 40 Thus, research subjects have been found to be "readily persuaded of the

131. See Stavros L. Brekoulakis, InternationalArbitration Scholarship and the Concept of Arbitration
Law, 36 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 745, 769 (2013).
132. See Samuelson & Zeckhauser, supra note 47, at 8-9; see also Edward L. Rubin, Public Choice, Phenomenology, and the Meaningofthe Modern State:Keep the Bathwater, but Throw Out That Baby, 87 CORNELL
L. REv. 309, 310-11 (2002) (discussing "the notoriousmacro-micro problem of social science" and the difficulties adherents of the Chicago School of microeconomics have in using public choice theory to predict political
action).
133. Nyhan & Reifler, Roles, supra note 25, at 2; see also Samuelson & Zeckhauser, supra note 47, at 47.
Some of the more frequently discussed phenomenon include "positive illusions, anchoring, the representativeness heuristic, hindsight bias, the framing ofoptions, irrelevant information, and the structure ofdecision-making
processes." Jean R. Sternlight & Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Psychology and Effective Lawyering:Insightsfor Legal
Educators, 64 J. LEGAL EDUC. 365, 370 (2015) (footnotes omitted). Others include contrast bias and procrastination bias. See Zimmerman, supra note 47, at 1134.
134. Nyhan & Reifler, Roles, supra note 25, at 2.
135. See Samuelson & Zeckhauser, supra note 47, at 8; Zimmerman, supra note 47, at 1134. Although
there are a number of key differences between individual and institutional (or group) decision-making processes,
the status quo bias is not limited to individuals. See Samuelson & Zeckhauser, supra note 47, at 45; Ozan 0.
Varol, ConstitutionalStickiness, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 899, 938 (2016). Instead, the principle also "influence[s]
policymaking within organizations, both public and private. Once made, policies frequently persist and become
codified implicitly or explicitly .... " Samuelson & Zeckhauser, supra note 47, at 45.
136. See Korobkin, Endowment Effect, supra note 47, at 1256-92 (citing examples).
137. See Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, The Psychology ofProceduralJustice in the Federal Courts, 63
HASTINGS L.J. 127, 166 n.201 (2011); Matthew J.B. Lawrence, ProceduralTriage, 84 FORDHAM L. REv. 79, 85
(2015) [hereinafter Lawrence, Triage]; Andrew E. Taslitz, Trying Not to Be Like Sisyphus: Can Defense Counsel
Overcome PervasiveStatus Quo Bias in the CriminalJustice System?, 45 TEX. TECH. L. REv. 315, 347 (2012).
138. Samuelson & Zeckhauser, supra note 47, at 10.
139. See Debra Lyn Bassett, Deconstruct and Superstruct: Examining Bias Across the Legal System, 46
U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1563, 1572-73 n.38 (2013) (surveying authorities); Samuelson & Zeckhauser, supra note
47, at 9.
140. See Solan, supra note 42, at 10.
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aggregate pattern of behavior (and the reasons for it), but seemed unaware (and
41
slightly skeptical) that they personally would fall prey to this bias."
As pronounced as the status quo bias is in laboratory settings, the effect is
often magnified in the real world because of the social, reputational, and financial costs that are associated with deviating from the established course of action.142 Economists frame these concerns in terms of sunk costs, regret avoid43
ance, and a drive for internal or psychological consistency.1 Thus, one reason
why people continue to question the legitimacy of international arbitration, despite suggestions from scholars that Congress and other policy-makers "should
not assume that juries necessarily make 'better' decisions than arbitrators,"l44 is
because of their unconscious desire to elevate the status of judicial procedures
145
so as to justify the sunk costs in national courts.
Increasing the perceived legitimacy of international arbitration may also
be somewhat threatening to individuals and institutions that benefit from the existing perception of litigation as the default norm. For example, increasing respect for international arbitration could not only diminish the reputation of the
judicial system by eliminating litigation's preferential status in the panoply of
dispute resolution alternatives, 146 but could also injure the social standing (and
47
perhaps financial opportunities) of judges,1 a powerful segment of the law148
Proponents of court proceedings may also be seeking to
making community.
avoid the type of cognitive dissonance that might arise if arbitration were found
49
to be as good as, or better than, litigation in resolving international disputes.1
Initially, it might appear useful to determine how litigation became the staeven though research shows that the status quo bias exists regardless of
quo,
tus
141. Samuelson & Zeckhauser, supra note 47, at 9.
142. See id. at 10.
143. See id. at 37-38.
144. Christopher R. Drahozal, A BehavioralAnalysis of PrivateJudging, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
105, 107 (2004).
145. See Samuelson & Zeckhauser, supra note 47, at 38-39.
146. Numerous authorities have identified a compelling state interest in maintaining the reputation of the
judiciary. See, e.g., Kamasinski v. Judicial Review Council, 44 F.3d 106, 111 (2d Cir. 1994); Doe v. Fla. Judicial
Qualifications Comm'n, 748 F. Supp. 1520, 1525 (S.D. Fla. 1990); Butler v. Ala. Judicial Inquiry Comm'n, 802
So. 2d 207, 215 (Ala. 2001); In re Chnura, 608 N.W.2d 31, 38-40 (Mich. 2000); In re Kaiser, 759 P.2d 392,
399 (Wash. 1988) (en banc).
147. Although a great deal has been written about the financial self-interest of arbitrators, the concept of
judicial self-interest has been considered far less frequently. See Joanna Shepherd, Measuring Maximizing
Judges: EmpiricalLegal Studies, Public Choice Theory, and Judicial Behavior, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 1753,
1754-55. However, research suggests that judges are extremely interested in maintaining or increasing the rate
of litigation in national courts. See id.; see also Tracey E. George & Chris Guthrie, Induced Litigation, 98 Nw.
U. L. REV. 545, 547 (2004) (noting how an increase in funding and judicial resources results in an increase in
litigation). Although the status of the judiciary varies from country to country, judges are among the elite in
many countries and would be loath to see that status eroded. See Thadd A. Blizzard, Gender and Judging, 25
HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 267, 270 n.11 (2014) (book review).
148. The judiciary has often responded to external threats by adopting strong-arm methods to defend the
status quo. See Dana A. Remus, The InstitutionalPoliticsofFederalJudicialConduct Regulation, 31 YALE L.
& POL'Y REv. 33, 38 (2012). Allowing parties to exit or avoid the judicial system is critically important given
the difficulties of policing the judicial branch. See Margaret Tarkington, The Truth Be Damned: The First
Amendment, Attorney Speech, and JudicialReputation, 97 GEO. L.J. 1567, 1606 (2009) ("[T]he punishment of
speech critical of the judiciary 'cannot safely be left to [the judiciary], who have an obvious vested interest in
the status quo' and in preserving their own reputations.") (quoting JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST
117 (1980)).
149. See Samuelson & Zeckhauser, supra note 47, at 39.
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how a particular procedure becomes the established norm.15 0 Indeed, Samuelson
and Zeckhauser found that "individuals fail to discriminate to some degree between imposed actions, random selections, and choices voluntarily (and thoughtfully) undertaken."15'
In the case of dispute resolution, "courts and jury trials were established to
be in the 'best' category by default" pursuant to a "traditional public civil justice
model." 52 However, the rise of international arbitration in the post-World War
II era and particularly since the 1980s has led to a certain amount of tension
between the relative status of litigation and arbitration.153 For example, as
Tracey George and Chris Guthrie note:
One group of scholars-which we call the "public adjudication" groupwould call for more courts and more judges even if the effect were to induce litigation. For these scholars, litigation is an underutilized public
good that should be expanded to meet latent demand among individuals
who "sit on their rights" rather than litigate. Another group of scholarswhich we call the "private ordering" group-would argue that society is
already too litigious. For these scholars, disputes should be resolved not
inside, but rather outside, the courtroom.1 54
Some observers frame the debate more forcefully in favor of the presumptive superiority of litigation.55 For example, Judith Resnik writes:
In theory, judges are agents of the state, charged with implementing its law
through public decision making; arbitrators are creatures of contracts,
obliged to effectuate the intent of the parties. The distinction is presumed
to be constitutionally respectful and welfare-maximizing, enabling the enforcement of public rights and protecting the autonomy of contractual relationships.
Yet the two practices-adjudication and arbitration-are coming to be
styled as fungible options on a "dispute resolution" (DR) spectrum. An
increasingly common parlance (crisscrossing the globe) replaces the
phrase "alternative dispute resolution" (ADR) with DR, so as to put
courts-now deemed "Judicial Dispute Resolution" (JDR) or "Judicial
Conflict Resolution" (JCR)-on a continuum of mechanisms responding
to conflicts. This formulation aligns courts with a range of options that
clouds courts' identity as a unique constitutionally obliged mode of decision making.1 56
150. See id. at 39-40.
151. Id. at 40.
152. Ron Spears, Are CourtsHeadingfor a Market Failure?, 103 ILL. B.J. 1, 52 (2015).
153. See BORN, supra note 1, at 68.
154. George & Guthrie, supra note 147, at 547-48 (speaking in the context of domestic proceedings, although the principle holds true in the international realm); see also Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Do the "Haves"
Come Out Ahead in Alternative JudicialSystems?: Repeat Players in ADR, 15 OHIO ST. J. ON DISp. RESOL. 19,
24-25 (1999) [hereinafter Menkel-Meadow, Repeat].
155. See Owen M. Fiss, The History ofan Idea, 78 FORDHAM L. REv. 1273, 1277 (2009).
156. Judith Resnik, Diffusing Disputes: The Public in the PrivateofArbitration, the Privatein Courts, and
the ErasureofRights, 124 YALE L.J. 2804, 2806-07 (2015) [hereinafter Resnik, Diffusing] (footnote omitted);
see also Menkel-Meadow, Repeat, supra note 154, at 25. Resnik coined the term "'Dispute Diffusion' . . . to
capture these new commitments to the eclipse of court-based adjudication as the primary paradigm for government-authorized dispute resolution." Resnik, Diffusing, supra, at 2807. Although Resnik excludes international
arbitration from her discussion, this point at least seems apt in the international context. See id. at 2808.

[Vol. 2018

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW

556

To some extent, these discussions arise because the legal community has
never truly decided whether arbitration is an alternative to, or the equivalent of,
litigation. 157 However, it is also possible that this debate arises because of an
unconscious belief that litigation must retain a position of superiority over arbitration, based solely on a bias in favor of the status quo.ss
IV. STATUS

A.

Quo BIAS AND

STICKY DEFAULTS

Litigation as the Dispute Resolution Default

In many ways, the status quo can be analogized to legal defaults, although
default rules describe behavior on a theoretical or predictive basis while the sta159
Both perspectus quo bias reflects empirically observed, actual phenomena.
tives are important to the current analysis, since they consider the actions of
individuals and institutions in both a forward- and backward-looking manner.
Adherents of the law and economics movement have conducted extensive
160
studies of the use and effect of defaults, not only in the area of contract law,
62
61
but also in other contexts, including procedurall and arbitral law.1 Generally
157. See, e.g., LARRY E. EDMONSON, DOMKE ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 1:1, 1-3 (2010) ("[Arbitration] coexists with court procedure as an adjunct and part of the American system of administering justice.");
id. § 1:3, 1-8-1-9 (indicating that early precedent distinguished between commercial arbitration as a substitute
for litigation and labor arbitration as a substitute for avoiding industrial strife, but suggesting that these distinctions may no longer apply); Cindy G. Buys, The Arbitrators'Duty to Respect the Parties' Choice of Law in
Commercial Arbitration, 79 ST. JOHN's L. REV. 59, 93-94 (2005) (noting differences between arbitration and
litigation); Nathan Isaacs, Two Views of CommercialArbitration, 40 HARV. L. REV. 929, 929 (1927); Pierre
Mayer, ComparativeAnalysis ofPower ofArbitratorsto DetermineProcedures in Civil and Common Law Systems, in ICCA CONGRESS

SERIES NO. 7, PLANNING EFFICIENT ARBITRATION

PROCEEDINGS: THE LAW

APPLICABLE IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 25 (Albert Jan van den Berg ed., 1996) ("[Sometimes] one considers arbitration as a substitute for State justice, albeit of a private nature, but nevertheless pursuing the same
ends."); Josef P. Sirefinan, In Search of a Theory ofArbitration, 26 ARBITRATION 68, 69 (1960); Jeffrey W.
Stempel, Keeping Arbitrationsfrom Becoming Kangaroo Courts, 8 NEV. L.J. 251, 260 (2007) ("[A]rbitration is
a substitute for adjudication by litigation .... ); Jean R. Stemlight, Creeping MandatoryArbitration:Is It Just?,
57 STAN. L. REV. 1631, 1673 (2005) (concluding arbitration is not the same as litigation); S.I. Strong, Does
Class Arbitration "Change the Nature" ofArbitration?Stolt-Nielsen, AT&T, and a Return to FirstPrinciples,
17 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 201, 241-45 (2012) (discussing the nature of arbitration). International disputes are
particularly difficult to analyze in this regard, since they can usually be heard in a variety of national courts if
an arbitration agreement does not apply. This phenomenon has led to a relatively complicated debate about the
theoretical nature of international arbitration. See, e.g., LEW ET AL., supra note 93, ¶ 5-4 (discussing the four
main theories of international arbitration: the jurisdictional theory, the contractual theory, the hybrid theory, and
the autonomous theory); Strong, Section 1782, supra note 92, at 348 (positing a new theory of international
arbitration based on the concept of concurrent jurisdiction).
158. See Samuelson & Zeckhauser, supra note 47, at 9.
159. See Korobkin, Endowment Effect, supranote 47, at 1271. Theoretical scholarship attempts to forecast
or predict certain behavior, while empirical research describes existing behavior. See id. at 1241.
160. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts:An Economic Theory ofDe-

fault Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 87-88 (1989); Willis, supra note 47, at 1165.
161. See Sergio J. Campos, Erie as a Choice ofEnforcement Defaults, 64 FLA. L. REV. 1573, 1577 (2012);
Daphna Kapeliuk & Alon Klement, Changingthe Litigation Game: An Ex Ante Perspective on Contractualized
Procedures,91 TEX. L. REV. 1475, 1475 (2013); Michael L. Moffitt, Customized Litigation: The CaseforMaking Civil ProcedureNegotiable, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 461, 462 (2007); Robert J. Rhee, Toward Procedural
Optionality:PrivateOrderingofPublicAdjudication,84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 514, 516-17 (2009); Matthew A. Smith
& Michael S. McPherson, Nudgingfor Equality: Values in LibertarianPaternalism, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 323,

328 (2009).
162. See Jack Graves, Court Litigation over Arbitration Agreements: Is It Time for a New DefaultRule?,
23 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 113, 114 (2012) [hereinafter Graves, Litigation]; Ryan McCarl, ICSID Jurisdiction
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speaking, default rules involve "settings or rules about the way products, policies, or legal relationships function that apply unless users, affected citizens, or
parties take action to change them." 63 Default provisions can be established by
choice or circumstance and can operate in a variety of fashions.1 64 For example,
some defaults operate as gap-fillers in cases where parties have not affirmatively
chosen a particular option.165 Other provisions, known as "policy defaults," are
adopted "with an explicit purpose to alter the ultimate position of the parties."1 6 6
These types of rules are set to a position that is assumed to be "good for most
individuals, under the assumption that only the minority who have clear preferences to the contrary will opt out."1 67

Policy defaults can be contrasted with "penalty defaults," which reflect a
position that one or more parties dislike and which mean to increase the likelihood that parties will attempt to contract around the default.168 Penalty defaults
are used when policy-makers are unsure of the rule that would be chosen by
informed individuals.169
Penalty defaults, like policy defaults, can be considered a type of "nudge"
to encourage parties to adopt certain types of behavior.170 According to Cass
Sunstein, "default rules, even or perhaps especially if they appear to be invisible,
count as prime 'nudges,' understood as interventions that maintain freedom of
choice, that do not impose mandates or bans, but that nonetheless incline people's choices in a particular direction."171 Although states have other means of
promoting individual or institutional behavior without limiting choice (such as
through the use of positive incentives), defaults are perhaps the most powerful
means of promoting a particular outcome, since they require parties to incur
transaction costs to avoid the default position.172 Indeed, the transaction costs
associated with negotiating for arbitration in international commercial and investment matters can be significant.173
over InternationalMass InvestmentArbitrations: Due Process andDefaultRules, 51 STAN. J. INT'LL. 173,190-

94(2015).

163. See Willis, supra note 47, at 1157.
164. Defaults may be adopted consciously or unconsciously by "choice architects." See Richard H. Thaler,
Do You Need a Nudge?, YALE INSIGHTS (Nov. 4, 2009) http://insights.som.yale.edu/insights/do-you-neednudge; see also RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH,
WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 6 (2008).
165. See Willis, supra note 47, at 1157.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. See lan Ayres, Regulating Opt-Out: An Economic Theory ofAlteringRules, 121 YALE L.J. 2032, 2087
(2012); Cass R. Sunstein, Deciding by Default, 162 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 35 (2013).
169. See Sunstein, supra note 168, at 5.
170. See THALER& SUNSTEIN, supra note 164, at6; Willis, supra note 47, at 1157 n.4; Ian Ayres, Ya-Huh:
There Are and Should Be Penalty Defaults, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 589, 617 (2006) [hereinafter Ayes, Ya-Huh].
171. Sunstein, supra note 168, at 5.
172. See Samuelson & Zeckhauser, supra note 47, at 33; Pierre Schlag, Nudge, Choice Architecture, and
Libertarian Paternalism, 108 MICH. L. REv. 913, 915-16 (2010) (book review); S.I. Strong, Incentives for
Large-ScaleArbitration:How Policymakers Can Influence Party Behaviour, in CLASS AND GROUP ACTIONS IN
ARBITRATION 146, 150-59 (Bernard Hanotiau & Eric A. Schwartz eds., 2016); Sunstein, supra note 168, at 5.
173. Most dispute resolution provisions in international commercial contracts are individually negotiated
unless the transaction is routine in nature. See GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND FORUM
SELECTION AGREEMENTS: DRAFTING AND ENFORCING 132 (4th ed. 2013). The dispute resolution mechanisms
found in bilateral and multilateral investment treaties are often subject to intense international negotiation over
a period of years, as demonstrated by the recent discussions regarding the investor-state dispute settlement
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Defaults can be set to maximize whatever substantive or procedural values
174
and the default does not have to be
the choice architect wants to promote,
175
visible or heavy-handed to have an effect. To the contrary, the cumulative
nature of small individual nudges can have significant results in shaping social
norms and expectations.1 76 As Russell Korobkin has observed:
[W]hen lawmakers anoint a contract term the default, the substantive preferences of contracting parties shift-that term becomes more desirable,
and other competing terms becoming less desirable. Put another way, contracting parties view default terms as part of the status quo, and they prefer
77
the status quo to alternative states, all other things equal.1
Litigation clearly operates as the default mechanism for resolving domestic
legal disputes.1 78 Litigation can also be considered the presumptive default for
international commercial disputes since those matters typically involve questions of private international law that would be resolved in national courts absent
an arbitration agreement. 179 The same can be said of international investment
disputes, particularly since treaty-based arbitration was created precisely to
avoid the type of biases commonly associated with domestic litigation in the
host state. 80
Litigation's status as the default norm is apparent, given that "the critiques
on the seeming 'unfairness' of international arbitration apparently arise from ex-

("ISDS") mechanism to be incorporated into the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership ("TTIP") between the United States and the European Union. See Press Release, European Commission, EU Finalizes Proposal for Investment Protection and Court System for TTIP (Nov. 12, 2015), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release IP-15-6059 en.htm [hereinafter European Commission Press Release]; see also BORN, supra note 1, at
120-26.
174. See Smith & McPherson, supra note 161, at 328.
175. See Thaler, supra note 164.
176. See id Notably, what parties consider to be the status quo appears to be set by legislation rather than
long-standing tradition. See Russell Korobkin, Inertia and Preferencein Contract Negotiation: The Psychological Power ofDefault Rules and Form Terms, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1583, 1602 (1998) ("The path of least resistance,
not ingrained historical tradition, appears to define the status quo for contracting parties.").
177. Korobkin, Bias, supra note 48, at 611-12.
178. See Lahav, supra note 115, at 1658.
179. See David P. Stewart, PrivateInternationalLaw: A Dynamic and Developing Field, 30 U. PA. J. INT'L
L.J. 1121, 1123 (2009); Christopher A. Whytock, Domestic Courts and Global Governance, 84 TUL. L. REV.
67, 122-23 (2009). While claims involving public international law (the law of nations) were once restricted to
international tribunals, such matters are also now increasingly heard in national court. See Mathias Reiman,
From the Law of Nations to TransnationalLaw: Why We Need a New Basic Coursefor the International Curriculum, 22 PENN ST. INT'L L. REV. 397, 410 (2004).
180. Litigation remains the default for investor-state disputes because court is generally the only available
forum absent an investment treaty (or arbitration agreement in a contract), and investors still need to identify the
availability of that option and file the request for arbitration, even in cases where a treaty does exist. See Strong,
Section 1782, supra note 92, at 333-34 (discussing "offer to arbitrate"). Investment treaties vary in how disputes
are to be resolved. Some treaties include a "fork-in-the-road" provision that states:
[I]f the investor chooses to submit a dispute to the host State courts or to any other agreed dispute resolution
procedure (for example, to ICC arbitration under the dispute resolution clause in the relevant investment
contract), the investor forever loses the right to submit the same claims to the international arbitration
procedure in the BIT.
LUCY REED ET AL., GUIDE TO ICSID ARBITRATION 100 (2d ed. 2011). Fork-in-the-road provisions are typically
limited to contract-based claims rather than treaty-based claims. While investors may have the right to bring a
treaty-based claim in arbitration, filing may be contingent on compliance with various preconditions, which
could include exhaustion of local remedies. See id. at 124-30.
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pectations wed to a more judicial or structurally adjudicative paradigm of international dispute resolution."' 8 1 Some commentators have sought to resolve the
tension between international litigation and international arbitration by calling
for the creation of new "extraterritorial courts" to address evolving forms of international disputes, based on the assumption that, "when it comes to offering
principled adjudication, public courts enjoy a number of structural advantages
over private arbitration."l 82 However, such mechanisms differ little from international arbitration in practice and indeed create a number of negative externalities of their own. 183
Richard Thaler has noted that choice architects often adopt the status quo
as their default without putting much thought into that decision.1 84 However, it
is critically important to determine what type of default litigation does, or
should, reflect. For example, litigation could be seen as a simple gap-filler that
arises in the absence of party agreement to the contrary. Framing litigation as an
ordinary default would suggest that the state has little to no interest in defending
or establishing court proceedings as the preferred means of resolving legal disputes.
Litigation could also be considered a type of policy default reflecting a
belief that the judicial system is the preferred or optimal means of addressing
legal disputes. This paradigm would likely be based on a belief that resolution
of legal disputes falls within the sovereign prerogative, which is discussed in
Part V.185
Finally, litigation could be characterized as a penalty default, particularly
in cases involving international disputes. A number of studies have suggested
that litigation of cross-border disputes in national courts is expensive, time-consuming, and prone to various types of procedural or substantive errors, which
indicate that judicial proceedings may operate as a penalty default, driving parties to resolve their disputes through alternative means. 186 Indeed, these factors,
181. Desierto, supra note 24, at 948.
182. Jens Dammann & Henry Hansmann, Globalizing Commercial Litigation, 94 CORNELL L. REv. 1, 4
(2008). Professors Jens Damimann and Henry Hansmann identified a number of alleged deficiencies of international arbitration based largely on a single empirical study of domestic U.S. disputes. See id. at 32; see also id.
at 34 n.95. However, they do not discuss and do not appear to have considered more recent empirical studies
focusing specifically on international disputes, even though there are significant differences between domestic
and international arbitration. See STRONG, JUDICIAL GUIDE, supra note 19, at 2-5; see also supra note 23 and
accompanying text (listing empirical studies of international arbitration). Furthermore, many of their conclusions-such as those relating to the alleged unpredictability of arbitration-fly in the face of well-established
arbitral theory and practice. See BORN, supra note 1, at 86, 98.
183. See Dammann & Hansmann, supra note 182, at 4-31; see also BORN, supra note 1, at 73-94 (discussing benefits of international arbitration). Other scholars seek to improve the perception of international arbitration by noting the way in which courts continue to supervise arbitral proceedings, thereby "borrowing" from the
legitimacy of the courts to increase the legitimacy of arbitration. See Christopher S. Gibson, Arbitration, Civilization and Public Policy: Seeking Counterpoise Between ArbitralAutonomy and the Public Policy Defense in
View ofForeignMandatory Public Law, 113 PENN ST. L. REv. 1227, 1265-67 (2009) (discussing the International Law Association's 2002 interim report on public policy as a bar to enforcement of international arbitral
awards).
184. See Thaler, supra note 164 ("The status quo is typically the default. And the choice architect typically
doesn't think very carefully about this.").
185. See infra notes 242-307 and accompanying text.
186. See BORN, supra note 1, at 70-71; WORLD BANK, DOING BUSINESs 2017: EQUAL OPPORTUNITY FOR
ALL (2017), http://www.doingbusiness.org/reports/global-reports/doing-business-2017 (describing and ranking
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along with long-standing and widespread difficulties in international enforcement of foreign judgments and the real or perceived lack of neutrality among
national court judges, explain why arbitration has become the preferred dispute
87
resolution mechanism in international commercial and investment matters.1
Some people might argue that litigation cannot be considered a penalty
default due to its long and enduring history and its intimate association with the
state.1 88 However, it is important to remember that the term "penalty default" is
not a pejorative; it is simply a term used to describe how a particular rule operates. As it turns out, plenty of state-affiliated procedures operate as penalty defaults.1 89 Furthermore, defensiveness at the suggestion that litigation might operate as a penalty default could be read as reflecting the unspoken and perhaps
unconscious belief that litigation is "better" than arbitration simply by virtue of
90
its age and connection with the state,1 even though arbitration has an equally
impressive pedigree and has existed in parallel with litigation since the beginning of recorded history in both the common law and civil law legal traditions.19
When seeking to appreciate the nature of litigation, it is important not only
to determine what type of default rule litigation is, but also to consider the intensity of pull toward the default. The strongest defaults (i.e., those that generate
"default inertia") are described as "sticky," meaning that more people adopt the
92
default position than would be expected if the rule were not in place.1 "Slippery
defaults" exist on the opposite end of the spectrum and reflect defaults that are
93
not sticky or are less sticky than initially intended by the choice architects.1
Policy defaults are typically meant to be relatively sticky, since that posi94
tion is believed to be optimal for most individuals.1 However, a default's
key aspects of national litigation relating to 190 countries under the "enforcing contracts" section). Institutions
are entirely capable of creating highly ineffective incentive systems through chance or choice. See Steven Kerr,
On the Folly ofRewardingA, While Hopingfor B, 9 ACAD. MGMT. EXECUTIVE 7, 7 (1995).
187. See BORN, supra note 1, at 73-93 (listing benefits of international arbitration over international litigation); S.I. Strong, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in U.S. Courts: Problems and Possibilities, 33 REV. LITIG. 45, 49 (2014).
188. See infra notes 253-54 and accompanying text.
189. See Ayres, Ya-Huh, supra note 170, at 590.
190. Such a belief may very well reflect a bias in favor of the status quo. See supra notes 128-58 and
accompanying text.
191. See BORN, supra note 1, at 7-63; DEREK ROEBUCK, ANCIENT GREEK ARBITRATION passim (2001);
DEREK ROEBUCK & BRUNO DE LOYNES DE FUMICHON, ROMAN ARBITRATIONpassim (2004); DEREK ROEBUCK,
EARLY ENGLISH ARBITRATIONpassim (2008); DEREK ROEBUCK, MEDIATION AND ARBITRATION IN THE MIDDLE
AGES: ENGLAND passim (2013); DEREK ROEBUCK, THE GOLDEN AGE OF ARBITRATION: DISPUTE RESOLUTION
UNDER ELIZABETH I passim (2015); Douglas Yam, The Death of ADR: A Cautionary Tale of Isomorphism
Through Institutionalization,108 PENN ST. L. REV. 929, 943-45 (2004). Although some commentators count
arbitration in the United States as beginning with the enactment of the Federal Arbitration Act in 1925, the
procedure has existed in the United States since colonial days. See Symposium, Introduction:Beyond the FAA:
ArbitrationProcedure, Practice, and Policy in HistoricalPerspective,2016 J. DISP. RESOL. 1, 1-5 (2016).
192. Willis, supra note 47, at 1157; see also Maurits Barendrecht & Berend R. de Vries, Fittingthe Forum
to the Fuss with Sticky Defaults: Failure in the Market for Dispute Resolution Services?, 7 CARDOZO J.
CONFLICT RESOL. 83, 83-84 (2005); Ryan Bubb & Richard H. Pildes, How Behavioral Economics Trims Its
Sails and Why, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1593, 1647 (2014) (discussing sticky default rules in the context of behavioral
law and economics theory, which is a growing field that emphasizes the combination ofpolitics and psychology);
Anne Van Aaken, BehavioralInternationalLaw and Economics, 55 HARV. INT'L L.J. 421, 428 (2014); Willis,
supra note 47, at 1157-58 ("The magnetism of defaults is believed to be so strong than it has been called the
'iron law of default inertia."').
193. Willis, supranote 47, at 1157 n.3.
194. Id. at 1157.
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"stickiness" is affected by both background conditions and mechanisms meant
to increase or decrease the power of the default.195 Indeed,
mechanisms that give defaults power can be divided into three classes:
transaction barriers, judgment and decision biases, and preference formation. "Transaction barriers" are obstacles to choosing options that reflect preferences, even when options and preferences are easily understood. "Judgment biases" skew perception and appraisal of options.
"Decision biases" are reactions to uncertainty about options or preferences. . . . In any particular situation, one or more of these three classes of
mechanisms may make defaults powerful for different individuals to varying degrees depending on, for example, how clearly the individual understands her options and her preferences.196
International arbitration has benefitted significantly from the removal of a
number of transaction barriers that previously existed as a matter of national and
international law.1 97 For example, the adoption of various international treatiesl 98 and model laws,1 99 supplemented by certain pro-arbitration policies, 200
have helped make international arbitration the dispute resolution mechanism of
choice among those who work routinely in international commercial and investment law.201Nevertheless, the status quo bias reinforces the stickiness of litigation as a dispute resolution default among those who have little or no experience
with international arbitration.202 Indeed, some of the most strident critics of investment arbitration are those who first learned about it during negotiations over

195. Id. at 1161 ("Background conditions that contribute to the traction of defaults are a confusing decision
environment and preference uncertainty.").
196. Id. at 1161-62.
197. See BORN, supra note 1, at 63-70. Interestingly, the concept of a transaction barrier can be used to
describe the legal background involving international commercial and investment mediation, which is not as
supportive as it is for international arbitration and which has led some commentators to call for additional
measures to remove the remaining transaction barriers. See S.I. Strong, Beyond InternationalCommercialArbitration? The Promise ofInternationalCommercialMediation, 45 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 11, 32 (2014). These
calls have led UNCITRAL to take up a proposal from the U.S. Department of State regarding a new treaty in
this area of law. See Rep. of Working Grp. H on the Work of its Sixty-Sixth Session (New York, 6-10 February
2017), ¶ 13, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/901 (Feb. 16, 2017) [hereinafter WGII Report]; Strong, Rationality, supra note
23, at 1985.
198. See Organization of American States, Inter-American Convention on Extraterritorial Validity of Foreign Judgments and Arbitral Awards, May 8, 1979, O.A.S.T.S. No. 51, 1439 U.N.T.S. 87 [hereinafter Montevideo Convention]; Inter-American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration of 1975, Aug. 15, 1990,
Pub. L. No. 101-369, 104 Stat. 448 (1990) [hereinafter Panama Convention]; Convention on the Settlement of
Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States, Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S.
159 [hereinafter ICSID Convention]; European Convention on International Commercial Arbitration, Apr. 21,
1961, 484 U.N.T.S. 364 [hereinafter European Convention]; New York Convention, supra note 118.
199. See, e.g., UNCITRAL Model Arbitration Law, supra note 118.
200. The pro-arbitration policy is particularly strong in international matters. See Final Act of the United
Nations Conference on International Commercial Arbitration, U.N. Doc. E/CONF.26/L.62 (June 6, 1958) (describing intent of UNCITRAL regarding international arbitration); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler ChryslerPlymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 629 (1985) (noting arbitration agreements should be enforced in the international
realm, "even assuming that a contrary result would be forthcoming in a domestic context").
201. See BORN, supra note 1, at 73, 122; Born, Generation, supra note 55, at 827; Sergio Puig, No Right
Without a Remedy. FoundationsofInvestor-StateArbitration, 35 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 829, 841 (2014).
202. See Willis, supra note 47, at 1165 (framing the status quo bias as a combination of judgment and
decision biases). Lack of expertise regarding aparticular issue increases decisional uncertainty and thus strengthens the status quo bias. See id. at 1161-62. Interestingly, arbitration may already be or may be becoming a sticky
default in international commercial and investment settings. See infra notes 225-41 and accompanying text.
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"mega-regional" treaties like the TPP and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership ("TTIP"),203 even though investment arbitration has been in
existence for decades and has developed into an extremely beneficial mechanism
for states. 204 Nevertheless, some of these latecomers speak of investment arbitration as if it were some sort of newly emergent phenomenon that threatens the
205
very pillars of sovereignty and democracy.
Other factors affect stickiness as well. For example, the pull toward the
default increases the longer the provision has endured, the greater the perceived
departure from the established norm, and the higher the number of alternatives. 206 Thus, the long-standing nature of the litigation default increases its
stickiness, as does the proliferation of alternative means of dispute resolution in
207
modern jurisprudence.
One issue that remains open is whether and to what extent international
arbitration can be considered to depart from the established norm. On the one
hand, international arbitration is very similar to international litigation in terms
208
of its procedural complexity and formality. Rather than reflecting the type of
"second class" justice that is commonly associated with domestic arbitration,
international arbitration has been referred to as "'Rolls Royce' justice" due to its
209
However, international
high degree of sophistication and individualization.
arbitration can be seen as departing from the litigation norm as a result of (1) arbitration's status as a private, party-controlled mechanism rather than a public,
state-controlled device and (2) arbitration's unique blend of common law and
2 0
civil law procedures. 1 As a result, these features may strengthen the intensity
of the pull toward litigation as the default norm.
203. See Alexander W. Resar, The Evolution ofInvestor-StateArbitrationin the Trans-PacificPartnership
Agreement, 34 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 159, 159-60 (2016) (noting conclusion of TPP and President Obama's
intent to sign); Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), OFF. U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE,
https://ustr.gov/ttip (last visited Jan. 18, 2018). For example, the debate about the need to establish a new judicial
entity-the Investment Court System-for use in the TTIP between the United States and the European Union
was particularly troubling to industry insiders. See Daniele Gallo & Fernanda G. Nicola, The External Dimension
ofEU Investment Law: JurisdictionalClashesand TransformativeAdjudication, 39 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 108 1,
1087 (2016); European Commission Press Release, supra note 173. The future of the TPP, TTIP, and other
investment treaties is in jeopardy under the new administration. See Minxin Pei, A Trade War with China is
Likely Under Donald Trump, FORTUNE (Nov. 10, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/1 1/10/donald-trump-chinatrade/.
204. See Born, Generation,supra note 55, at 838-44.
205. See id. at 842-44; Barnali Choudhury, RecapturingPublic Power: Is Investment Arbitration'sEngagement ofthe Public Interest Contributingto the DemocraticDeficit?, 41 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 775, 77879 (2008) [hereinafter Choudhury, Recapturing].
206. See Varol, supra note 135, at 940-41.
207. See Samuelson & Zeckhauser, supra note 47, at 8 ("The more options that were included in the choice
set, the stronger was the relative bias for the status quo.") (emphasis omitted). The world of international dispute
resolution has become increasingly diversified in the post-World War II period. See Born, Generation,supra
note 55, at 778-90; Gerhard Wagner, The Dispute Resolution Market, 62 BUFF. L. REv. 1085, 1095 (2014) ("The
real market to analyze is not the market for judicial services but, more broadly, the market for dispute resolution
services. That includes not only the settling of disputes via arbitration, but also the many varieties of alternative
.

dispute resolution, such as expert proceedings, conciliation, mediation, etc.").
208. See BORN, supra note 1, at 2126 ("[P]articularly in major matters, elements of the procedures of an
international arbitration can closely resemble proceedings in the commercial courts of some major trading
states.").
209.

RUSSELL J. WEINTRAUB, INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION AND ARBTRATION: PRACTICE AND PLANNING

455 (1994); see also BORN, supranote 1, at 2129.
210. See BORN, supra note 1, at 2125-26.
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Judicial proceedings may also enjoy a "first-mover advantage" as a result
of the widespread perception that litigation constitutes the first formal means of
resolving legal disputes. 211 The "first-mover advantage" is related to the concept
of an "anchor" that can be used to skew later decision-making by framing all
alternatives as relative to the anchor. 21 2 "Anchoring bias" is well documented in
the legal and psychological literature and is similar, in ways, to the status quo
bias.213
Research has suggested that the first-mover advantage can be both pronounced and long-lasting, particularly in cases where first movers achieve "a
technological edge over competitors," "preempt later arrivals' access to scarce
assets," or "build an early base of customers who would find it inconvenient or
costly to switch to the offerings of later entrants." 2 14 Each of these criteria could
be said to apply to litigation, although the gap may be narrowing, particularly
with regard to technical expertise, since international arbitrators are widely believed to have considerable skills in resolving commercial and investment dis-

putes. 2 15

While it may seem unusual to frame the world of international dispute resolution as a competitive market, such characterizations are consistent not only
with theoretical paradigms advanced by law and economics scholars, but also
with observable phenomena, including ongoing battles within the field for jurisdictional, institutional, and individual supremacy. 216 Scholars have also described the relationship between litigation and arbitration in market terms 217 and
have recognized various supply-side distortions arising out the protective environment surrounding litigation.218
Research also suggests that litigation may benefit from the first-mover effect as a result of the judiciary's institutional role as a constitutional and political

211. Fernando Suarez & Gianvito Lanzolla, The Half-Truth ofFirst-MoverAdvantage, HARV. Bus. REV.
121, 122 (2005) ("A first-mover advantage can be simply defined as a firm's ability to be better off than its
competitors as a result of being first to market in a new product category. . .. Although no advantage lasts
forever, firms that succeed in building durable first-mover advantages tend to dominate their product categories
for many years .... ).
212. See Varol, supra note 135, at 947. In fact, arbitration has existed in parallel with litigation for centuries. See supra note 191 and accompanying text.
213. See Dan Orr & Chris Guthrie, Anchoring, Information, Expertise, and Negotiation:New Insightsfrom
Meta-Analysis, 21 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsP. RESOL. 597, 598 (2006) ("[A]nchoring has a significant impact on negotiators and negotiation outcomes."); Varol, supra note 135, at 948.
214. Suarez & Lanzolla, supra note 211, at 122.
215. See BORN, supra note 1, at 73. Some of these qualities could also be used to explain why international
arbitration has been preferred to international mediation. See id. at 73-93; see also infra notes 225-41 and accompanying text.
216. See Christopher R. Drahozal, Innovation in ArbitrationLaw: The Case ofDelaware, 43 PEPP. L. REV.
493, 494 (2016); Wagner, supra note 207, at 1132-34.
217. See Edward Brunet, Replacing FolkloreArbitrationwith a ContractModel ofArbitration, 74 TUL. L.
REv. 39, 41 (1999) ("Arbitration developed in a free market, competing with courts for an increasing share of
the supply of dispute resolution."); Gilles Cuniberti, Beyond Contract - The Casefor Default Arbitration in
International Commercial Disputes, 32 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 417, 419 (2009); Nikolaos Lavranos, National
Courts, Domestic Democracy, and the Evolution ofInternationalLaw: A Reply to Eyal Benvenisti and George
Downs, 20 EUR. J. INT'L L. 1005, 1010 (2009); Spears, supra note 152, at 53; Wagner, supra note 207, at 1095.
218. Barendrecht & de Vries, supra note 192, at 83-84 (writing in the domestic context) ("[P]roviders of
default dispute resolution services, such as courts and lawyers, are effectively shielded from competition . . . .").
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matter. For example, Ozan Varol has argued not only that "[t]he prevailing orthodoxies in the existing constitutional order occupy an 'almost monopolistic
position"' in terms of status and influence but that "[t]he repeated application of
existing constitutional provisions elevates them to a higher position" so that
"[c]ompeting constitutional norms may thus be perceived as presumptively undesirable." 219 This phenomenon suggests that international arbitration suffers in
comparison to litigation in terms of legitimacy because of the heightened respect
220
given to judicial proceedings in most constitutional regimes.
This hypothesis may be particularly compelling given the international nature of the analysis, for although international arbitration is also part of the U.S.
constitutional framework by virtue of an extensive web of treaties which are
221
considered the law of the land pursuant to the Supremacy Clause, numerous
scholars have suggested that the United States does not grant a great deal of
222
respect to international law as a matter of practice. Interestingly, international
arbitration may be given a higher degree of respect in those countries that adopt
223
or in those couna monist (rather than dualist) approach to international law
tries that provide specific protections for arbitration as a matter of constitutional
law.224

B.

Arbitrationas the DisputeResolution Default

Although litigation represents the legal default for resolving legal disputes,
parties' overwhelming preference for arbitration in international commercial
and investment matters could be taken to suggest that international arbitration is
in the process of overcoming the status quo bias to become the default as a matter
of practice, at least among those who are actually engaged in international commerce and investment. 225 However, the extensive and ongoing criticism of international arbitration from journalists, judges, and laypersons suggests that the
226
current situation does not reflect a universal shift toward a new default. In-

219. Varol, supra note 135, at 939.
220. See U.S. CONST. art. III, §§ 1-2; see also infra notes 242-307 and accompanying text.
221. See U.S. CONST. art. VI; ICSID Convention, supra note 198; New York Convention, supra note 118;
Panama Convention, supra note 198; 2012 U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/188371.pdf; S.I. Strong, Monism and Dualism in International Commercial Arbitration.
Overcoming Barriers to Consistent Application ofPrinciples ofPublic International Law, in BASIC CONCEPTS
OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW: MONISM & DUALISM 547, 555-68 (Marko Novakovic ed., 2013) [hereinafter
Strong, Monism and Dualism].
222. See David H. Moore, ConstitutionalCommitment to InternationalLaw Compliance?, 102 VA. L. REV.
367, 368-72 (2016); D.A. Jeremy Telman, A Monist Supremacy Clause and a DualisticSupreme Court: The
Status of Treaty Law in the United States, in BASIC CONCEPTS OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 571, 574-78,

585-89.
223. See Strong, Monism and Dualism, supra note 221, at 555-68.
224. See CONSTITUCi6N POLITICA DE COLOMBIA [C.P.] art. 116 ("Individuals may be entrusted temporarily
with the function of administering justice as jurors in criminal proceedings, as mediators or as arbitrators authorized by the parties to issue verdicts in law or in equity in [sic] the terms defined by the law."); see also id.
art. 29 (involving due process); see also Strong, Constitutional,supra note 50, at 86-87, 93, 99-105 (discussing
constitutional actions involving arbitration); Strong, Monism and Dualism, supra note 221, at 555-68.
225. See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text.
226. See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text.
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stead, the preference for international arbitration may simply reflect the viewpoint of a particular epistemic group made up of specialists in international arbitration. 227
It is also possible to describe this phenomenon in psychological terms involving the status quo bias. According to behavioral economists, the act of
choosing a particular alternative raises its value in the eyes of the decision-maker
through a process known as "preference formation."228 "All things equal, this
induces a bias toward retaining the choice in subsequent decisions even under
changed conditions." 229 As a result, a positive initial experience can lead to the
creation of a new status quo bias in favor of that altemative. 230 This phenomenon, which has been observed through empirical studies, 23 1 would not only explain the marked preference for international arbitration within the international
dispute resolution community, but would also explain many of the difficulties
currently experienced by those advocating the increased use of mediation and
conciliation in international commercial and investment disputes. 232
Support for international arbitration is so high within the arbitral community that some people have recommended making arbitration the legal default
for cross-border business disputes. For example, Gary Bom has proposed adoption of an international treaty making arbitration the default for international
commercial disputes and has even drafted model language for states interested
in pursuing this type of mechanism. 233 Other commentators have suggested similar initiatives at the national level, either through the creation of legislation establishing arbitration as the default in international commercial cases 234 or

227. See S.I. Strong, Clash of Cultures: Epistemic Communities, Negotiation Theory and International
Lawmaking, 50 AKRON L. REv. 495, 502 [hereinafter Strong, Epistemic Communities] (discussing the extraordinarily large number of conferences involving international arbitration).
228. Willis, supra note 47, at 1161-62; see also Samuelson & Zeckhauser, supra note 47, at 40.
229. Samuelson & Zeckhauser, supra note 47, at 40.
230. See id.; Willis, supra note 47, at 1169-70.
231. Lisa Bernstein raised the possibility of a status quo bias in favor of certain types of domestic arbitration
in the early 1990s. See Korobkin, Bias, supra note 48, at 621 n.43.
232. See Strong, Epistemic Communities, supra note 227, at 514 (noting difficulties in negotiating a new
instrument on international commercial conciliation due to the influence of different epistemic groups in international dispute resolution); Strong, Rationality, supra note 23, at 2009, 2063 (noting the preference for international commercial mediation among those that had experience with the process); see also Samuelson & Zeckhauser, supra note 47, at 46 (discussing status quo bias involving public policy negotiations). UNCITRAL is
currently drafting a new international instrument that may eliminate a number of the transaction barriers associated with international commercial mediation and conciliation. See WGII Report, supra note 197, ¶ 13; see also
supra notes 194-201 and accompanying text. It is possible the new instrument could be made applicable in the
investment context as well, if adopted in individual bilateral investment treaties ("BITs").
233. See Draft Model Bilateral Arbitration Treaty, https://www.wilmerhale.com/uploadedFiles/
SharedContent/Editorial/News/Documents/Draft-Model-BAT.pdf; Gary Born, BITS, BATS, and Buts: Reflections on International Dispute Resolution, 4, https://www.wilmerhale.com/uploadedFiles/SharedContent/Editorial/News/Documents/BITs-BATs-and-Buts.pdf; see also Graves, Litigation, supra note 162, at 136 (calling
for the arbitral community "to move beyond mere revisions of the New York Convention" and instead adopt "a
new convention that fully recognizes arbitration as the default legal rule for resolution of international commercial disputes").
234. See Cuniberti,supra note 217, at 487; Jack M. Graves, Arbitration as Contract: The Needfor a Fully
Developed and Comprehensive Set ofStatutory DefaultLegal Rules, 2 WM. & MARY Bus. L. REv. 227, 233-34

(2011).
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through the adoption of a "strong" version of negative competence-competence.235 This latter suggestion would allow national courts to consider international arbitration to be the defacto choice of international commercial actors in
236
the absence of a clear indication to the contrary.
The preference for arbitration among specialists in international commerinvestment disputes is at least as strong as the preference for litigation
and
cial
which suggests the debate between the two camps will
nonspecialists,
among
continue. While there are those who believe that policy-makers should take heed
of the recommendations of relevant epistemic groups, particularly in areas (such
237
the
as international arbitration) that require specialized technical knowledge,
depolitical
and
legal
in
recent
evidence
empirical
and
expert
to
indifference
bates raises questions as to the role that subject-matter expertise will play in the
future. 238 Furthermore, policy-makers are not themselves immune to uncon239
scious influences such as the status quo bias. Indeed, those who are part of the
established power structure (such as legislators and judges) may be particularly
worried by activities that appear to threaten the legitimacy and viability of their
chosen belief systems and professional activities, and thus may be more prone
to cognitive distortions that promote the continuation of the existing legal regime. 240 Thus, the power of the bias in favor of litigation may be the result not
only of the psychological effect of the status quo but also of an equally forceful
24 1
pull in favor of state-sanctioned activities per se.
V.

LEGITIMACY AND THE SOVEREIGN PREROGATIVE

The final issue to consider involves the possible connection between the
perceived legitimacy of international arbitration and what might be called "the
sovereign prerogative." 242 Courts and commentators have long recognized that

235. See Graves, Litigation,supranote 162, at 114. In its standard form, negative competence-competence
describes the propensity of national courts to give arbitral tribunals the opportunity to decide questions of their
own jurisdiction in the first instance. See BORN, supra note 1, at 1049. While most countries hold that arbitral
tribunals have jurisdiction to decide their own jurisdiction (the positive notion of competence-competence, also
known as Kompetenz-Kompetenz), some legal systems-most notably France-consider the only realistic way
to give effect to competence-competence is to impose a negative duty on national courts to refuse to hear arbitration-related concerns until after the arbitration has run its course, except in the most extreme cases. See id.
(noting negative competence-competence varies in its intensity, depending on the policy of the country in question).
236. See Graves, Litigation,supra note 162, at 114.
237. See Strong, Epistemic Communities, supranote 227, at 530-31.
238. See Strong, Alternative Facts, supra note 9, at 138-42.
239. See Samuelson & Zeckhauser, supra note 47, at 45.
240. See supra notes 142-45 and accompanying text (discussing social, reputational, and financial costs
associated with challenging the status quo bias).
241. See George & Guthrie, supra note 147, at 547-48; Resnik, Diffusing, supra note 156, at 2806-07;
Varol, supranote 135, at 939.
242. See William J. Novak, Common Regulation: Legal Origins ofState Power in America, 45 HASTINGS
L.J. 1061, 1085 (1994) ("The 'lex prerogativa' stood for that complex and varied set of rights, powers, and
privileges belonging to the Crown as sovereign. Included in this bundle of prerogatives were powers (and obligations) to regulate and promote the domestic life of the kingdom.").
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states have an inherent interest in the proper adjudication of civil disputes, including those heard in arbitration. 243 For example, David Luban has suggested
that litigation generates a variety of public goods, including the opportunity for
nonlitigants to intervene in the action, identification and publication of facts important to the public, mechanisms for facilitating and enforcing settlements, creation of legal rules and precedents, and systemic transformation of various types
of public and private institutions.244 However, other commentators, most notably
John Lande, have argued that most, if not all, of these goals can be attained
through means other than litigation.245
Even if states have an interest in the adjudication of private disputes, that
does not necessarily mean that dispute resolution is or should be an exclusive
function of the state. To the contrary, numerous authorities, including the U.S.
Supreme Court, have recognized that private means of dispute resolution, including arbitration, are legitimate in a variety of contexts. 246 Questions therefore
arise regarding the precise nature of the state interest in dispute resolution, particularly in cross-border commercial and investment cases, and what weight that
interest should be given. 247
243. See, e.g., Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., Solano Cty., 480 U.S. 102, 113 (1987);
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476-77 (1985); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,
444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980) (noting the importance of"the forum State's interest in adjudicating the dispute" when
considering questions of personal jurisdiction); William W. Park, The ArbitrabilityDicta in First Options v.
Kaplan: What Sort ofKompetenz-Kompetenz Has Crossed the Atlantic, 12 ARB. INT'L 137, 138-40 (1996); see
also Vasil Marmazov & P.V. Pushkar, Is There a Right to FairSettlement ofa Case by Means ofArbitration, as
Guaranteed by the European Convention on Human Rights?, 2 L. UKR. 52, 52-64 (2001), http://eurolaw.
org.ua/publications/ukrainian-joumal-of-european-studies/5-2011/42-is-there-a-right-to-fair-settlement-of-acase-by-means-of-arbitration-as-guaranteed-by-the-european-convention-on-human-rights. There is, of course,
a state interest in upholding parties' contractual rights, which would affect the state interest in upholding arbitration. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1; Eli Lilly Do Brasil, Ltda. v. Fed. Express Corp., 502 F.3d 78, 88-89
(2d Cir. 2007) (Meskill, J., dissenting); Preferred Capital, Inc. v. Sarasota Kennel Club, Inc., 489 F.3d 303, 308
(6th Cir. 2007).
244. See David Luban, Settlements and the Erosion of the Public Realm, 83 GEO. L.J. 2619, 2622-29
(1995); see also Jack B. Weinstein, Some Benefits and Risks ofPrivatizationofJustice Through ADR, 11 OHIO
ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 241, 247-51 (1996).
245. See John Lande, Symposium: How Much Justice Can We Afford?: Defining the Courts' Roles and
Deciding the AppropriateNumber of Trials, Settlement Signals, and Other Elements Needed to Administer Justice, 2006 J. DISP. RESOL. 213, 225-28 (2006).
246. See Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 160-61 (1978) ("This system of rights and remedies,
recognizing the traditional place of private arrangements in ordering relationships in the commercial world, can
hardly be said to have delegated to Flagg Brothers an exclusive prerogative of the sovereign.. . . [W]e do not
consider a more detailed description of [New York law] necessary to our conclusion that the settlement of disputes between debtors and creditors is not traditionally an exclusive public function."); BORN, supra note 1, at
130, 957. Most authorities conclude that the state has a special interest in criminal law matters due to the potential
restrictions on a person's liberty. See Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, Civil and CriminalSanctions in the Constitution
and Courts, 94 GEO. L.J. 1, 8 (2005). However, the line between criminal law and civil law has become increasingly blurred, which raises questions about the applicability of various constitutional protections. See id. at 5;
see also David A. Sklansky & Stephen C. Yeazell, Comparative Law Without Leaving Home: What Civil Procedure Can Teach CriminalProcedure, and Vice Versa, 94 GEO. L.J. 683, 684 (2006).
247. See Strong, Section 1782, supra note 92, at 352. Some commentators have suggested that the state
interest in promoting commerce is the primary driving force in international commercial arbitration. See Loukas
Mistelis, Reality Test: Current State ofAffairs in Theory and Practice Relating to "Lex Arbitri," 17 AM. REV.
INT'L ARB. 155, 178 (2006) (suggesting commercial interests overcome state interests in "subjecting arbitration
proceedings to national law."); see also Strong, Section 1782, supra note 92, at 360 ("Some authorities have
attempted to distinguish state interests in investment arbitration from those in international commercial arbitration on the basis of the underlying substantive law, claiming that the state interest in investment arbitration is or
should be more pronounced because investment disputes involve important issues of public or regulatory law.").
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Most analyses regarding the state interest in dispute resolution are framed
248
or
in general terms, with broad, sweeping statements about judicial efficiency

the preservation of the fairness of the process. 249 However, these concerns cannot be used to oppose the legitimacy of international arbitration because empirical studies have shown that international arbitration provides a fair and efficient
procedure that is equal to litigation in many national systems and superior to
250
litigation in numerous others.
One interesting theory that has not been extensively discussed in the literature involves a potential state interest in preserving constitutional institutions,
which would include the judiciary. 251This approach, which might be related to
Burkean prudential concerns militating against major institutional change that
may threaten traditional institutions, not only demonstrates the influence of the
status quo bias in favor of litigation, it also suggests the possibility of an implied
sovereign prerogative in dispute resolution. 252
This proposition bears further analysis, since political theorists have long
253
recognized the links between judicial jurisdiction and sovereign prerogative.
Indeed, the concept of state-sanctioned systems of justice as being superior to
all others dates back to the medieval era and the concept of natural law and the
divine right of kings. 254 Eventually, the evolution of constitutional democracy
transformed the divine right of kings into the contemporary concept of legal legitimacy as a popular mandate. 255 Although some scholars have identified a certain amount of tension between democracy and popular sovereignty, given the

248.

See Andrew Le Sueur, Access to Justice Rights in the United Kingdom, 5 EUR. HUM. RTS. L. REV.

457, 473 (2000).
249. See Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1076 (1991); John Hardwicke et al., NCALJ Panel
Discussion, ALJ Decisions- Final or Fallible?, in 25 J. NAT'L ASS'N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 191, 199 (2005).
250. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
251. See Aziz Z. Huq, Standingfor the StructuralConstitution, 99 VA. L. REv. 1435, 1444-47 (2013).
252. See Varol, supranote 135, at 939; Brad Masters, Comment, Reconciling Originalism with the Father
of Conservatism: How Edmund Burke Answers the Disruption Dilemma in N.L.R.B. v. Noel Canning, 2013
BYU L. REv. 1061, 1073 (2013); see also Carl T. Bogus, Rescuing Burke, 72 Mo. L. REv. 387, 390 (2007)
(noting some legal commentators misread Edmund Burke).
253. Various commentators have considered judicial jurisdiction and the sovereign prerogative to resolve
disputes from the perspective of political theory, although such analyses are no longer in vogue, given the current
emphasis on law and economics. See, e.g., MARTIN H. REDISH, FEDERAL COURTS IN THE POLITICAL ORDER:
JUDICIAL JURISDICTION AND AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORY 3 (1991) ("[T]he questions of ifand when a federal
court is to adjudicate an issue of constitutional or federal law--questions traditionally answered by the doctrines
of federal jurisdiction-will implicate principles of American political theory as much as how those substantive
legal issues are ultimately resolved."); EUGENE V. RoSTOw, THE SOVEREIGN PREROGATIVE: THE SUPREME
COURT AND THE QUEST FOR LAW xvi (1962); Charles Silver, American Political Theory Considered, 60 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 562, 563 (1992) ("There is no disputing [the] claim that deep questions of constitutionalism,
political theory, and jurisprudence arise when one thinks seriously about the federal law ofjurisdiction. To identify the set of cases federal courts should hear, one must offer a normative account of the role of the federal
courts.").
254. See Delbraick,supranote 63, at 32-33; Philip B. Kurland, Curia Regis: Some Comments on the Divine
Right ofKings and Courts to Say What the Law Is, 23 ARIZ. L. REV. 581, 582 (1981). For a useful discussion of
the historical rise ofjudicial independence, see Scott D. Gerber, The Court, the Constitution, and the History of
Ideas, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1067, 1089 (2008) (discussing the evolution of judicial independence as a matter of
political theory from the early common law period).
255. See Kurland, supra note 254, at 582.
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latter's monarchal roots, 256 conventional wisdom justifies the principle of popular sovereignty through reference to the social contract. 257 As a result, contemporary commentators routinely claim that "democratic institutions, including
courts, ought to be preferred sites for effecting changes in law and public policy." 258 Of course, as Carrie Menkel-Meadow has noted, arbitration is in many
ways better situated than litigation to promote democratic values in dispute resolution, given the amount of autonomy and self-governance inherent in arbitration.259

Most contemporary analyses regarding the sovereign prerogative and litigation focus on whether judicial procedures promote and provide moral, legal,
and political legitimacy.260 However, some inquiries approach the issue from a
structural perspective and consider the role played by various constitutional
courts. 261 For example, theorists have argued that the elevation of constitutional

courts over other national courts-and, in some cases, over the legislature262
can lead to a type of quasi-religious mysticism whereby constitutional judgeslike kings and popes-are seen as incapable of error.263 This phenomenon is
reflected in language referring to the "cult of the court" (sometimes referred to

256.

See Kornhauser,

supra note

57, at 840 n.40 (citing

STEPHEN M.

GRIFFIN, AMERICAN

CONSTITUTIONALISM: FROM THEORY TO POLITICS 19-26 (1996)).

257. See id. at 840 ("United States political theory and popular belief both hold that the government's
authority (that is, its legitimacy) rests on the consent of the governed. This consent derives from social contract,
but it is not the traditional contract between the governing and the governed. Rather, the consent is amongst the
people who agreed to form a government for their mutual benefit . . . ."). Social contract theory has been discussed for centuries by such esteemed political philosophers as Hugo Grotius, Thomas Hobbes, Samuel von
Pufendorf, John Locke, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Immanuel Kant, and John Rawls. See Rubin, supra note 132, at
355-56.
258. Kevin E. Davis & Helen Herschkoff, Contractingfor Procedure, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 507, 514
(2011); see also supra notes 63, 97 and accompanying text (noting democratic elements of legitimacy).
259. See Menkel-Meadow, DeliberativeDemocracy, supra note 125, at 18-19 (discussing Jirgen Habermas); see supra note 125 and accompanying text.
260. See also Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Lawyer's Role(s) in Deliberative Democracy, 5 NEV. L.J. 347,
348 (2004); Winston P. Nagan & Aitza M. Haddad, Sovereignty in Theory and Practice, 13 SAN DIEGO INT'L
L.J. 429, 485-86 (2012) (discussing sovereignty and legal process as reflected in HENRY M. HART & ALBERT
M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (1994)); Note,

Filling the Void: Judicial Powerand JurisdictionalAttacks on Judgments, 87 YALE L.J. 164, 199 n.169 (1977)
("[P]rocess has replaced sovereign prerogative as a defining attribute ofjudicial power.").
261. Each country structures its judiciary in its own unique manner. However, many civil law systems
separate their courts by subject matter, with one branch devoted to constitutional matters. See PETER DE CRUZ,
COMPARATIVE LAW IN A CHANGING WORLD 72-76, 78-79, 86-88 (3d ed. 2007).
262. The United States in particular is known for its system of "judicial supremacy," which exists in contrast to the notion of parliamentary or legislative supremacy. See Janet L. Hiebert, New ConstitutionalIdeas:
Can New ParliamentaryModels Resist JudicialDominance When InterpretingRights?, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1963,
1963-65 (2004). Some commentators have suggested that judicial supremacy provides the "emotional cement"
that binds together different factions within a legal system. Max Lemer, Constitution and Court as Symbols, 46
YALE L.J. 1290, 1306 (1937).
263.

See JOHN BRIGHAM, THE CULT OF THE COURT 63 (1987) (quoting WALTER MURPHY, ELEMENTS OF

JUDICIAL STRATEGY 13 (1964)). U.S.-style judicial review is not limited to common law countries. For example,
Germany also allows "a posterioriconstitutional review of legislation," although Germany does not appear to
have a "cult of the court" similar to that in the United States. Elaine Mak, Book Note, JudicialTransformations:
The Rights Revolution in the Courts ofEurope, 6 EUR. CONST. L. REV. 163, 169 (2010) (reviewing MITCHELL
LASSER, JUDICIAL TRANSFORMATIONS: THE RIGHTS OF REVOLUTION IN THE COURTS OF EUROPE (2009)). Con-

versely, the United Kingdom does not embrace U.S.-style judicial review (the term "judicial review" in England
refers to a particular type of administrative review) but does hold judges in high regard. See Hiebert, supra note
262, at 1963-64.
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as the "cult of the judge") 264 and the "oracular myth 'of the judge as a high priest
2 65
A number of
of justice with special talents for elucidation of "the law.""
266
altinfallibility,
judges have explicitly embraced this perception of judicial
relethe
within
role
their
of
hough others have explicitly recognized the limits
267
vant constitutional structure.
While the veneration of judges is to be expected in common law countries
268
due to the role that "judge-made law" plays in those legal systems, many civil
law countries exhibit significant respect for the judiciary, even in legal systems
269
(such as France) that have a heightened regard for democratic institutions.
However, these types of historical and cultural influences may affect national
perceptions about the legitimacy of international arbitration. For example,
France's long-standing concerns about judicial excess may be the reason that
France considers international arbitration to be an honorable and highly legiti270
mate procedural device.
In some ways, the link between the sovereign prerogative and national
courts may be traced back to political theorists who have implicitly suggested
that the state is the rightful arbiter of legal disputes through references to the
notion of the public good. 271 For example, John Rawls has written that "[a]ll
citizens should have the means to be informed about political issues" and
"should be in a position to assess how proposals affect their well-being and
2 72
which policies advance their conception of the public good." Adherents to this
view might question whether international arbitration can be considered legiti273
However, Rawls
mate due to its use of private and confidential procedures.
not implicated
are
which
issues,"
"political
to
statements
his
specifically limited

264. See BRIGHAM, supra note 263, at 63. The phrase "cult of the robe" appeared in the United States as
early as 1828. Id.
265.

Id. at 63 (quoting WALTER MURPHY, ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL STRATEGY 13 (1964)).

266. See Valerie Richardson, ScaliaDefends Keeping God, Religion in Public Square, WASH. TIMES (Oct.
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/oct/1/justice-antonin-scalia-defends-keeping-god2014),
1,
religio/ ("What can they do to me? I have life tenure.") (quoting former U.S. Supreme Court Justice Antonin
Scalia).
267. See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1952) ("We are not final because we are infallible, but we are
infallible only because we are final.") (Jackson, J., concurring), superseded by statute, 29 U.S.C. § 2254(d)
(2012); BENJAMIN CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 141 (1921) ("The judge, even when he is
free, is still not wholly free.").
268. See, e.g., DWORKIN, supra note 80, at 407; Kurland, supra note 254, at 581.
269. See Cesare Pinelli, The PopulistChallenge to ConstitutionalDemocracy, 7 EUR. CONST. L. REv. 5,
13 (2011). French concerns about excessive judicial power date back to the French Revolution. See K. ZWEIGERT
& H. KOTZ, AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 89-90 (Tony Weir trans., 3d ed. 1998).
270. See BORN, supra note 1, at 1049 (discussing the French approach to negative competence-competence); Cuniberti,sup, a note 217, at 418; Pinelli, supra note 269, at 12. Although such issues are beyond the
scope of the current Article, it would be interesting to consider how national perceptions about the traditional
role of the judiciary align with views about the legitimacy of international arbitration.
271. See Stephen J. Ware, Is Adjudication a Public Good? "Overcrowded Courts" and the Private Sector
Alternative ofArbitration, 14 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 899, 909-15 (2013). Political theorists sometimes
refer to this as the "common good." See Menachem Mautner, Three Approaches to Law and Culture, 96
CORNELL L. REv. 839, 862 n.106 (2011).
272. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 225 (1971).
273. See BORN, supranote 1, at 89-90.
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in many arbitral proceedings. 274 Furthermore, there are a variety of ways to provide the public with "the means to be informed about political issues" in arbitration, assuming that members of the public do indeed wish to take up that opportunity. 275

The political conception of the public good (sometimes referred to as "a
public good") is sometimes confused with the notion of "public goods" in economic theory. 276 Although the two principles are similar, the economic approach
to public goods involves "a supposedly value-neutral technique to coordinate
economic activity between states and markets" while the political conception
focuses on "a normative standard to evaluate the justice of legal arrangements
that make up the state polity." 277 However, the two principles can be construed

in a harmonious manner for purposes of the current discussion, since law and
economics scholars often characterize litigation as a type of "public goods,"278
which is consistent with the political notion that the public has both a right and
an interest in having disputes heard in a public forum.
Some scholars go even further and argue that procedural law in general
constitutes public goods. 279 However, it is unclear whether this claim relates to a
particular aspect of civil or criminal procedure or to the overarching structure of
the judiciary. 280 Other interpretive problems arise when consequentialist theories, such as those involving law and economics, are applied to questions of procedure, since procedural law values fairness as much as it does efficiency, which
is the primary concern of the law and economics movement. 281 Indeed, reliance
on theories requiring the maximization (or at least optimization) of efficiency is

.

274. See RAWLS, supra note 272, at 225. Critics tend to question the legitimacy of investment arbitration
more than international commercial arbitration precisely because of the political aspects of the former proceedings. See supra note 110 and accompanying text (noting the quasi-public nature of investment arbitration).
275. For example, anecdotal reports suggest that relatively few people take the opportunity to attend open
hearings in the investment arbitration context. See supra note 113 and accompanying text (regarding livestreaming).
276. See Daniel Augenstein, To Whom It May Concern: InternationalHuman Rights Law and GlobalPublic Goods, 23 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 225, 226-27 (2016).
277. Id.
278. See Davis & Herschkoff, supra note 258, at 514; George & Guthrie, supra note 147, at 555-56 ("[T]he
justice system appears to be a pure public good because the courts resolve disputes peacefully and articulate
legal rules that enable people to order their lives, [which leads to] benefits (or output) [that] are nonexcludable
and nonrival. ... [Courts] are not purely public [goods because some benefits inure to individuals and are thus]
... inherently divisible and rival.") Pure public goods may be "consumed by many actors without reducing the
benefits to any one actor." Davis & Herschkoff, supra note 258, at 514.
279. See Andr6 Nollkaemper, InternationalAdjudication ofGlobalPublic Goods: The Intersection ofSubstance and Procedure, 23 EUR. J. INT'LL. 769, 777 (2012).
280. See Strong, ProceduralChoice, supra note 102, at 1052 ("Although the notion of a state procedural
prerogative dominated the jurisprudential landscape for many years, commentators have recently identified a
possible distinction between the law relating to litigation procedures and the law relating to judicial organization.").
281. See Owen M. Fiss, The Death ofthe Law, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 1, 5 (1986) ("[The efficiency hypothesis rests largely on a normative assumption. . . . Such a normative assumption cannot ... save an enterprise that
purports to be descriptive and predictive. . . ."); Michael I. Swygert & Katherine Earle Yanes, A Unified Theory
ofJustice: The Integration ofFairness into Efficiency, 73 WASH. L. REv. 249, 261 (1998) (noting efficiencybased arguments are problematic in cases involving procedural rights because "(i]n many private relations, . .
courts and other decisionmakers have not allowed what would be the most efficient 'Coasean' result"); see also
Gunnar Beck, Legitimation Crisis, Reifying Human Rights and the Norm-CreatingPower of the Factual:Reply
to "Reifying Law: Let Them Be Lions," 26 PENN. ST. INT'L L. REv. 565, 579-80 (2008) (classifying law and
economics as a consequentialist theory); Strong, ProceduralChoice, supra note 102, at 1055-58.
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somewhat questionable in the procedural context given the numerous inefficien282
cies that litigation purposefully embraces as a matter of dispute system design.
Although these practices may not always result in a savings of time or money,
283
they are nevertheless necessary as a matter of procedural justice.
The public interest in litigation, particularly litigation outcomes, may be
highest in common law jurisdictions because of the role that judicial decisions
play in the development of the law. 28 4 Certainly this rationale has been enunciated by various critics of arbitration, 285 based largely on the belief that arbitration's inability to create hard precedent reduces the legitimacy of the procedure. 286 However, such arguments lack persuasiveness, since they not only
overlook the legitimacy of various unpublished and nonprecedential agency decisions, 287 but also ignore the diminished role of judge-made law in common
law legal systems. 288
The latter phenomenon is the result not only of common law countries'
increasing reliance on statutes, 289 but also of the extremely large number of reported (and in some jurisdictions, unreported) decisions that are now available
290
in most jurisdictions, which dilutes the value of any individual opinion. Indeed, as Richard Posner has noted, it is now physically impossible to conduct a
291
comprehensive analysis of every relevant precedent in any particular case, a
282. See Janet Cooper Alexander, Judges' Self-Interest and ProceduralRules: Comment on Macey, 23 J.
LEGAL STUD. 647, 647 (1994); Steven S. Gensler, JudicialCaseManagement: Caughtin the Crossfire,60 DUKE
L.J. 669, 723 (2010); Jonathan R. Macey, JudicialPreferences, Public Choice, and the Rules ofProcedure, 23
J. LEGAL STUD. 627, 627 (1994). For example, one of the United States' most hallowed procedural practices,
U.S.-style discovery, is extremely inefficient. See Martin H. Redish, Pleading,Discovery, and the FederalRules:
Exploring the FoundationsofModern Procedure,64 FLA. L. REv. 845, 849 (2012); Schwartz, supra note 69, at
141.
283. See Alexander, supra note 282, at 647; Gensler, supra note 282, at 723; Macey, supra note 282, at
627.
284. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Adjudication as a Private Good, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 235,
259 (1979); Ware, supra note 271, at 910.
285. See Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1085 (1984) [hereinafter Fiss, Settlement];
Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, supra note 6, at 2. See generally Ross & Yong, supra note 6.
286. See W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Toward a Theory ofArbitralPrecedentin Arbitration, 51 WM. & MARY
L. REv. 1895 (2010) ( "[A]rbitrators may not immediately enjoy unquestioned legitimacy as producers of law
[but] . . [this] discussion explores the process by which arbitrators might gain such legitimacy . . . ."). But see
Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, Arbitral Precedent: Dream, Necessity or Excuse?, 23 ARB. INT'L 357, 361-78
(2007) (suggesting arbitration already recognizes and creates certain forms of soft precedent).
287. See, e.g., In re Three Eight Corp., [1992-1994 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH)1 25,749
at 40,444 (June 16, 1993) ("[U]nless the reasoning of an initial decision [by an administrative law judge] is
specifically adopted by the Commission, it does not represent Commission precedent."); Margaret Gilhooley, 3
ADMIN. L.J. 53, 53 (1989) ("Not all agencies publish their decisions, however, nor do they make them available
as a body of decisions or regard them as precedential.").
288. See GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 5-7 (1985). This phenomenon
can be explained by economic concepts of market saturation and diminishing returns. See J.B. Ruhl & Harold J.
Ruhl, Jr., The Arrow of the Law in Modern Administrative States: Using Complexity Theory to Reveal the Diminishing Returns and IncreasingRisks the Burgeoning ofLaw Poses to Society, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 405,
411-12 (1997).
289. See CALABRESI, supra note 288, at 5-7.
290. The distinction between reported and nonreported decisions can be significant. See J.J. GEORGE,
JUDICIAL OPINION WRITING HANDBOOK 403-07 (4th ed., 2000).

291. See POSNER, supra note 82, at 76; see also Ryan C. Black et al., Upending a Global Debate: An
EmpiricalAnalysis of the U.S. Supreme Court's Use of TransnationalLaw to InterpretDomesticDoctrine, 103
GEO. L.J. 1, 14 (2014) ("[There are] diminishing returns to exhaustive documentation of every such source,
especially when the goal is at least in part to write opinions that will be accepted as legitimate and binding.").
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factor that has led adherents of the law and economics movement to "question
whether the benefits precedents confer on non-parties justifjies] the public subsidy for adjudication" 292 and to suggest that certain types of claims should not
be heard in court, but instead made subject to arbitration so as to free up valuable
public resources for other purposes. 293
Together, these elements suggest that linking the legitimacy of particular
proceedings to the ability to generate binding precedent not only misstates various issues of substance, but also seeks to address a problem (i.e., a shortage of
judicial decisions) that does not in fact exist. 294 Furthermore, those who focus
solely on precedent fail to address the underlying philosophical question of
whether international arbitration, like litigation, can constitute a public good, as
some commentators have claimed. 295 For example, if the public good of procedural law is associated with procedure qua procedure, 296 then no distinction can
realistically be made between international litigation and international arbitration, given the high degree of formality and sophistication associated with both
processes. 297 Indeed, if such a distinction can be made, international arbitration
would likely prove superior, given its unique ability to harmonize elements
drawn from both the common law and civil law legal traditions, its aptitude for

This phenomenon requires judges and advocates to utilize their discretion when selecting which legal authorities
to present, although that process is increasingly influenced not by finely honed legal acumen but by automated
search mechanisms, which calls into question issues relating to the development of the common law. See Black
et al., supra, at 14. ("Selective citation is ... a reality . .. as there are always more potentially relevant precedents
and authorities that could be cited and which may detract from the ultimate conclusion.") (emphasis omitted);
Ian Gallacher, Forty-Two: The Hitchhiker's Guide to Teaching Legal Research to the Google Generation,39
AKRON L. REv. 151, 153 (2006); Susan Nevelow Mart, The Algorithm as a Human Artifact: Implicationsfor
Legal (Re)Search, 109 L. LIB. J. 387 (2017) (breaking down the algorithmic effects of Westlaw, Lexis Advance,
Fastcase, Google Scholar, and Casetext on legal research).
292. Ware, supra note 271, at 912.
293. See Lawrence, Triage, supra note 137, at 130; see also id. at 80-82 ("Hearings are a scarce resource
in many administrative and judicial processes. . . . Our reliance on a one-size-fits-all approach to distributing
scarce procedural protections among claimants makes sense [in only limited circumstances.]); Ware, supra note
271, at 915.
294. For example, intemational arbitration is often considered to generate various forms of soft precedent
deemed to be a type ofpublic goods. See Kaufmann-Kohler, supra note 286, at 361-78; Rogers, Vocation, supra
note 107, at 1005 ("In a meaningful sense, international arbitration produces precedents that are public goods.");
Strong, Reasoned Awards, supra note 102, at 15 ("[A]rbitral awards are considered very important forms of
persuasive authority and have been said to reflect a type of 'soft precedent' in certain types of international
disputes (most notably those involving investment and sports arbitration) and in certain types of matters (most
notably those involving arbitral procedure).").
295. See Bamali Choudhury, InternationalInvestment Law as a Global Public Good, 17 LEWIS & CLARK
L. REv. 481, 484 (2013) (claiming investment arbitration constitutes a global public good because "it provides
an overarching legal framework that guides FDI [foreign direct investment] activity and enhances its predictability and ... provides a mechanism by which FDI inflows benefit investors and states alike," two features that
also apply to international commercial arbitration); Choudhury, Recapturing,supra note 205, at 791 (discussing
investment arbitration); Jennifer Kirby, What Is an Award, Anyway?, 31 J. INT'L ARB. 475, 475 (2014) (noting
view of preeminent international commercial arbitrator who "considered international arbitration to be the key
to world peace"); Rogers, Vocation, supra note 107, at 963.
296. See Nollkaemper, supra note 279, at 777.
297. See BORN, supra note 1, at 2127 ("[Plarticularly in major matters, elements of the procedures of an
international arbitration can closely resemble proceedings in the commercial courts of some major trading
states."); WEINTRAUB, supra note 209, at 455.
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producing a widely enforceable outcome, and its capacity for facilitating Habermasian principles of autonomy. 298
Proponents of litigation as a public dispute resolution device promoting
public values through a public process have often denigrated arbitration as a
second-class device suitable only for unimportant private disputes that do not
affect political concerns. 299 However, as Carrie Menkel-Meadow has noted, the
distinction between public and private is often "murky" in the world of dispute
resolution, 300 particularly in light of the increasing privatization of judicial procedures. 30 1
This is not to say that some academics have not adopted a bright-line approach to these types of concerns. For example, constitutional scholars such as
Owen Fiss support judicial resolution of disputes based on the belief that the
primary purpose of litigation "is not to maximize the ends of private parties, nor
simply to secure the peace, but to explicate and give force to the values embodied in authoritative texts such as the Constitution and statutes: to interpret those
values and to bring reality into accord with them." 302 In his mind, "[a]djudication
is nothing more or less than a social institution for interpreting and enforcing our
public values.. .. [T]he social understanding. . . is not peculiarly the property
of lawyers, but properly belongs to the body politic and can thus appropriately
3 03
be considered 'political.'
While this approach continues to find support from some segments of the
scholarly, judicial, and popular communities, 304 Fiss was writing in the immediate aftermath of the Pound Conference. The Pound Conference triggered the
move toward arbitration and other forms of alternative dispute resolution in the
United States and thus reflected a time in which the status quo was seen as under
particularly sharp attack, even though the Pound Conference was convened by
U.S. Supreme Court Chief Justice Warren Burger, one of the most prominent
figures of the legal establishment. 305 However, in the forty years since the Pound
Conference, other commentators, such as Menkel-Meadow, have come to appreciate that blanket condemnation of particular types of dispute resolution as
298. See BORN, supra note 1, at 73-93 (listing benefits of international arbitration over international litigation); Menkel-Meadow, DeliberativeDemocracy, supra note 125, at 19.
299. See BORN, supra note 1, at 2127, 2129; WEINTRAUB, supra note 209, at 455; see also supra notes
272-75 and accompanying text (regarding Rawls).
300. Menkel-Meadow, Repeat, supra note 154, at 31-32.
301. This process was largely triggered as a means of responding to the challenges of arbitration. See Robert G. Bone, PartyRulemaking: Making ProceduralRules Through Party Choice, 90 TEX. L. REv. 1329, 136267 (2012); Davis & Herschkoff, supra note 258, at 520-64; Jaime Dodge, The Limits of ProceduralPrivate

Ordering, 97 VA. L. REv. 723, 776-83 (2011); David A. Hoffman, Whither Bespoke Procedure?,2014 U. ILL.
L. REv. 389, 392-95, 402-25; Matthew J.B. Lawrence, Mandatory Process, 90 IND. L.J. 1429, 1431 (2015);
Judith Resnik, Procedureas Contract, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 593,667-68 (2005); Strong, ProceduralChoice,
supra note 102, at 1034-35.
302. See Fiss, Settlement, supra note 285, at 1085; see also Owen M. Fiss, The Law Regained, 74 CORNELL

L. REv. 245, 249 (1989) [hereinafter Fiss, Regained].
303. Fiss, Regained, supra note 302, at 249.
304. See supra notes 6-16 and accompanying text.
305. See William H. Erickson, The Pound ConferenceRecommendations: A Blueprintfor the Justice System in the Twenty-First Century, 76 F.R.D. 277, 279-81 (1977) (noting the Pound Conference, convened by
U.S. Chief Justice Warren Burger, called for the development of various means of alternative forms of dispute
resolution, including arbitration); Fiss, Settlement, supra note 285, at 1073.
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contrary to the public good is either unnecessary or inappropriate. 306 Instead, the
better question is not whether one is "for or against" private dispute resolution,
but "when, how, and under what circumstances" particular cases should be subject to something other than judicial adjudication, a process that has come to
redefine "ADR" as involving "appropriate dispute resolution" rather than "alternative dispute resolution." 307
VI. CONCLUSION

As the preceding suggests, the legitimacy of international arbitration can
be quite contentious. However, this Article has identified a number of incontrovertible conclusions.
First, it is beyond cavil that discussions about the legitimacy of international arbitration are affected by the status quo bias.308 Social scientists have
empirically established the existence of the status quo bias in a variety of settings, and there is no reason to doubt that it affects the perception of international
arbitration on an unconscious level. 309 Indeed, a simple heuristic test, discussed
below, can be used to confirm this conclusion.
Second, litigation's status as the default for resolving legal disputes has
clearly affected popular, judicial, and scholarly perceptions about the legitimacy
of international arbitration, even though the original choice architects may not
have consciously intended to give litigation any type of preferential status.310
Regardless of whether litigation is considered a penalty default, a policy default,
or a gap-filling device, the simple fact that parties must contract out of judicial
proceedings if they wish to engage in arbitration reinforces the view of litigation
as the preferred, state-sanctioned norm. 311 Now that the effect of the default is
known, however, there are a number of ways to eliminate or minimize the current state of affairs through various policy "nudges," if there is sufficient political will to do So.312
Third, it appears likely that concerns about the legitimacy of international
arbitration are based, at least to some extent, on a belief that the resolution of
legal disputes falls within the sovereign prerogative of the state. 313 This perception may be affected by various cognitive distortions, such as the status quo bias
or the first-mover effect, or by certain theoretical phenomena, such as those relating to legal defaults and the "stickiness" of constitutional institutions. 314 However, the view that litigation is the best or only means of resolving legal disputes
is controverted by historical evidence that arbitration has operated in tandem
306. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Whose DisputeIs It Anyway?: A Philosophicaland DemocraticDefense
of Settlement (in Some Cases), 83 GEO. L.J. 2663, 2664-65 (1995) [hereinafter Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute]; see also Katherine R. Kruse, Learningfrom Practice: What ADR Needs from a Theory ofJustice, 5 NEV.
L.J. 389, 393 (2004) (discussing the evolution of Menkel-Meadow's work).
307. Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute, supra note 306, at 2664-65.
308. See supra notes 128-58 and accompanying text.
309. See supra notes 128-58 and accompanying text.
310. See supra notes 159-241 and accompanying text.
311. See supra notes 159-241 and accompanying text.
312. See supra notes 233-36 and accompanying text.
313. See supra notes 242-307 and accompanying text.
314. See supra notes 128-58, 194-215 and accompanying text.
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with litigation for millennia 3 15 and empirical evidence that contemporary forms
of international arbitration proceed in a fair and evenhanded manner. 316
The preceding pages have demonstrated the many ways in which the status
quo bias, the effect of legal defaults, and the influence of a perceived sovereign
prerogative are interconnected. However, all of these issues can be traced back
to the status quo bias, since it may very well be possible-once the bias is overcome-to generate sufficient political will to alter the legal default rules, thereby
changing the perception that the state has a sovereign prerogative in matters relating to the resolution of legal disputes. 317 The question therefore arises as to
how to overcome the status quo bias.
Generally speaking, it is very difficult to overcome unconscious cognitive
distortions like the status quo bias, since people often fail to recognize the existence and effect of those influences on their decision-making processes. 318 Indeed, Samuelson and Zeckhauser have suggested that "even if the [status quo]
bias is recognized, there appear to be no obvious ways to avoid it beyond calling
on the decision-maker to weigh all options evenhandedly." 3 19 Thus, the best, if
not only, way to remedy the status quo bias in favor of litigation is through education regarding the way in which these types of cognitive distortions operate, 320 a strategy that differs significantly from the current content-based approach to criticism of international arbitration. 321 Of course, as empirical tests
have shown, individuals and institutions will likely resist the notion that they
themselves are subject to the status quo bias, even if they agree that such a bias
exists in others. 322
Efforts to identify and overcome the status quo bias may be facilitated by
a heuristic known as the "Reversal Test," which philosophers Nick Bostrom and
Toby Orb developed to determine whether the status quo bias is affecting a particular decision. 323 According to the Reversal Test:
When a proposal to change a certain parameter is thought to have bad overall consequences, consider a change to the same parameter in the opposite
direction. If this is also thought to have bad overall consequences, then the
onus is on those who reach these conclusions to explain why our position
cannot be improved through changes to this parameter. If they are unable
to do so, then we have reason to suspect that they suffer from status quo
bias.324

In the current situation, international litigation reflects the status quo and
changes to increase party autonomy through the use of international arbitration
are considered to have negative consequences (i.e., be in some way illegitimate).
315. See supra note 191 and accompanying text.
316. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
317. See Thaler, supra note 164, at 83 (noting that legal default rules are often created without conscious
thought, but that change is possible).
318. See supra note 140 and accompanying text (discussing the "bias blind spot").
319.
Samuelson & Zeckhauser, supra note 47, at 9.
320. See Bassett, supra note 139, at 1572-73 (surveying authorities); Varol, supra note 135, at 940-41.
321. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
322. See Solan, supra note 42, at 10.
323. See Bostrom & Ord, supra note 43, at 664-65.
324. Id.
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According to the Reversal Test, the existence of a bias in favor of litigation can
be tested by asking whether it would be better to eliminate all autonomy in the
resolution of international disputes and require all matters to be heard in court,
thereby prohibiting international arbitration as well as international mediation
and conciliation. 325 Given the current level of support for international arbitration among states (for example, the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, more commonly known as
the New York Convention, is the most successful commercial treaty in history,
with 157 states parties 326) and among parties (for example, up to 90% of all international commercial contracts currently include an arbitration provision, 327
with similar mechanisms in place in approximately 93% of the 3,000-5,000 international investment treaties now in effect32 8), it is safe to say that any attempt
to eliminate or even curtail international arbitration would be considered disastrous by both users and policy-makers. 329 Thus, the Reversal Test strongly suggests the existence of an unconscious bias favoring litigation in international
commercial and investment matters.
Bostrom and Ord recognize that the existence of a bias in favor of the status
quo does not mean that the balance is inappropriately set. 330 Once the Reversal
Test has demonstrated the operation of the status quo bias, however, the burden
shifts to the proponents of the status quo to indicate why the existing regime
should be maintained. 33 1
It is beyond the scope of the current Article to identify and discuss the
various ways the status quo in favor of litigation might be defended. However,
it is necessary to note that proponents of litigation cannot simply refer to the prolitigation or anti-arbitration arguments identified in the preceding pages to meet
the burden identified in the Reversal Test, since the Reversal Test reverses the
burden of proof and requires proponents of the status quo to show, by at least a
preponderance of the evidence, that the current approach is superior to the proposed altemative. 332 That standard appears difficult to meet given the significant
amount of empirical evidence supporting the legitimacy of international arbitration and the views of those epistemic communities that are best placed to provide
expert analysis of the issue. 333
325. Mediation, conciliation and arbitration are all private (non-judicial) forms of dispute resolution based
on party autonomy. See Strong, Rationality, supra note 23, at 1980 n.18.
326. See New York Convention, supra note 118, at 1; Status Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, UNCITRAL, http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/NYConventionstatus.html (last visited Jan. 18, 2018); see also supra notes 198-200 and accompanying
text (discussing other international instruments supporting international arbitration).
327. See Sandrock, supra note 2, at 37.
328. See OECD, supra note 3, at 7, 17; Strong, Mass Procedures, supranote 3, at 300 n.271.
329. Attempts have been made to eliminate various forms of domestic arbitration, but, as previously noted,
domestic arbitration is very different from international arbitration. See Thomas V. Burch, Regulating Mandatory Arbitration, 2011 UTAH L. REv. 1309, 1311 (2011) (discussing 139 anti-arbitration bills introduced in Congress between 1995 and 2010); see also supra note 29 and accompanying text.
330. See Bostrom & Ord, supra note 43, at 665.
331. Seeid.
332. See supra notes 6-16 and accompanying text (discussing various challenges to the legitimacy of international arbitration).
333. See Strong, Epistemic Communities, supra note 227, at 502 (discussing epistemic groups in international dispute resolution); see also supra note 23 and accompanying text.
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Notably, Bostrom and Orb's heuristic can be used to test other presump334
tions of procedural superiority in the field of international dispute resolution.
For example, the Reversal Test can be used to gauge whether there is a bias in
favor of international arbitration and against international mediation and concil335
iation by specialists in international dispute resolution.
Some may claim that even if litigation benefits from an unconscious bias
in its favor, any attempt to change the status quo would be too costly. Bostrom
and Orb have anticipated this type of concern and created a more complex heu336
The Double
ristic, the Double Reversal Test, to account for transaction costs.
Reversal Test states:
Suppose it is thought that increasing a certain parameter and decreasing it
would both have bad overall consequences. Consider a scenario in which
a natural factor threatens to move the parameter in one direction and ask
whether it would be good to counterbalance this change by an intervention
to preserve the status quo. If so, consider a later time when the naturally
occurring factor is about to vanish and ask whether it would be a good idea
to intervene to reverse the first intervention. If not, then there is a strong
prima facie case for thinking that it would be good to make the first inter337
vention even in the absence of the natural countervailing factor.
Although it is beyond the scope of the current Article to consider fully the various ramifications of the Double Reversal Test, this mechanism provides a useful
and objective response to arguments that certain procedural changes are too
costly to adopt. 338
Commentators have long suggested that international arbitration could
339
and the
benefit from increased use of interdisciplinary theoretical analysis,
preceding discussion has shown precisely why such studies are needed in this
field. Rather than defend the legitimacy of international arbitration through repeated, but ultimately unpersuasive, empirical studies, the better approach may
be for the arbitral community to understand why the procedure remains subject
to attack. As the preceding discussion has shown, the problem is not with the
mechanism itself but with the perception of the process. By relying on various
types of social scientific research-particularly studies involving psychology,
philosophy, political science, and economics-this Article has provided a new,
and hopefully more fruitful, approach to the debate about the legitimacy of international arbitration.

334. See Bostrom & Ord, supra note 43, at 679 ("The reversal heuristic is in principle applicable to any
situation where we want to evaluate the consequences of some proposed change of a continuous parameter.").
335. See id. at 664-65; see also id. at 676 (noting those who wish to determine the relative merits of more
than two different dispute resolution alternatives (such as litigation, arbitration, and mediation) can use the Reversal Test by considering two options at a time); Strong, Epistemic Communities, supra note 227, at 503-04
(discussing a possible bias against international mediation and conciliation).
336. See Bostrom & Ord, supranote 43, at 673.

337.

Id.

338.
339.

See id.
See Brekoulakis, supra note 131, at 746.

